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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the performance of German and U.S.-led PRTs currently 
deployed in Afghanistan. The major conclusion of this thesis is that the PRTs are limited 
in their capabilities to significantly reconstruct or bring stability to Afghanistan. Despite 
their initial success between 2003 and 2005, they are currently unable to address the 
challenges in Afghanistan. Utilizing systematic case studies this thesis examines the 
structure, strategy, and experiences of German and U.S.-led PRTs. The assessment 
focuses on four different performance criteria: capacity building, stability, relationship-
building, and aid projects and coordination. Research is based on reports of international 
organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, as well as on various NGO reports. 
It is found that the PRTs limitations are not only a consequence of their structural 
limitations, but also are a result of Afghanistan’s dynamic environment, with all its facets 
and requirements. The main external factors influencing PRTs are Islam, tribal structures, 
poor governance and a sobering economic situation. This thesis contributes to an 
advanced understanding of how PRTs function, as well as updating available information 
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This thesis assesses the performance of the German and United States (U.S.)-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The thesis focuses solely on the 
PRTs of the United Nations (UN)-mandated and NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The objective is to examine the 
approaches taken by the PRTs and the extent to which they are effective in dealing with 
the current situation in Afghanistan. Additionally, this thesis updates available 
information on NATO in Afghanistan and the deployed PRTs as well as contributing to 
an advanced understanding of the situation. 
The overarching research question is: To what extent are the German and U.S.-led 
PRTs in Afghanistan fulfilling their declared objectives? The following questions 
concern key issues relating to the major topic: 
• What are the declared objectives of the PRTs? 
• What factors explain the shortfalls? 
• How do the political culture and the economic and societal circumstances 
of Afghanistan affect the performance of the PRTs? 
• How does the poor security situation throughout the country hamper PRT 
actions? 
B. THESIS IMPORTANCE 
NATO command of ISAF began in 2003. The request and the foundation of the 
ISAF mission can be traced to the Bonn Agreement in 2001. ISAF represents the military 
engagement of the international community in Afghanistan as well as the political, 
economic, development and aid efforts. The PRTs are the sole military asset on the 
ground throughout the country, whose mission it is to fulfil not only NATO’s objectives, 
but also the goals of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). Moreover, the outcome of the 
PRT activities contribute to political, economic and development objectives as well. This 
makes the PRT itself an asset for post-conflict scenarios, including the capability to 
rebuild a country. It is of utmost importance to scrutinize the performance of PRTs and 
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assess their effectiveness due to their dominating importance in the rebuilding of 
Afghanistan. If the PRTs fail, the efforts of the international community could be in 
jeopardy.  
The overall security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated since mid-2006. The 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist movements still use the borderland between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan for their purposes. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has not 
brought global security; the overall security situation in South and Central Asia has not 
improved significantly since 2001. Circumstances in Afghanistan still pose a threat to the 
Western world, and it is imperative to defeat this threat and rebuild Afghanistan. 
C. EXISTING LITERATURE AND SCHOLARLY BACKGROUND 
This section reviews the existing literature concerning Afghanistan and the PRTs. 
The intention is to highlight important arguments concerning PRTs in Afghanistan and to 
deduce propositions from the literature. The subsections of this literature review 
correspond to the key sections and propositions presented by this thesis. 
1. General Concepts and Objectives of the PRTs in Afghanistan 
In October 2003, the president of the United Nations Security Council distributed 
a letter to all members of the Security Council regarding NATO’s political objectives and 
ISAF’s desired end-state. The letter’s attachments included the “Longer-term strategy for 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in its International Security Assistance Force role 
in Afghanistan,” approved by the North Atlantic Council on 1 October 2003. The desired 
end-state was defined as “A self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan 
government, in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, able to 
exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan, without the need for ISAF 
to help provide security.”1 The desired end-state will be measured and assessed on a 
periodic basis and reported to the United Nations.2 
                                                 
1 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2003 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council (New York: [2003]). 
2 Ibid. 
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NATO’s website offers a fact-sheet overview of all Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs), Regional Commands (RCs) and Headquarters ISAF (HQ ISAF) including 
participating nations and personnel strength. Furthermore, the ISAF expansion 
throughout Afghanistan and the mission itself are stated in the source.3 
The NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan explains the concept of the 
PRTs long-term strategy and states the strategic goals of the ISAF mission as security, 
governance and development.4 
The U.S., UK, and German PRT concepts, as of 2005, are examined in Peter V. 
Jakobsen’s study, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient. He analyzes the 
contribution of the PRTs in relation to their mission statements. His main argument is 
that the PRTs can only be used in a transition phase. This initial phase is followed by a 
deployment of means and assets to overcome the insurgencies and rebuild Afghanistan 
over the long-term. Jakobsen points out that the military forces of the PRTs are not able 
to effectively fight the causes of the insurgencies in Afghanistan. In his view, the main 
destabilizing factors are the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the infighting between the warlords, 
the increased lawlessness and banditry, the booming opium poppy cultivation and the 
drug trade.5 PRTs, according to Jakobsen, have little impact on these phenomena. 
Gerd Brandstetter argues that the heavy PRTs, such as the German one in 
Konduz, are generally more suitable for supporting the nation-building process due to the 
fact that such PRTs usually have more personnel and military capabilities available. 
Thus, the staff can operate 24/7 sustainably as well as concurrently lead and plan 
operations. Such PRTs have not only the capability to show force in the respective area of 
operations (AOR), but also special capabilities, such as information operations and 
human intelligence gathering. Additionally, liaisons have to be established and 
                                                 
3 NATO, “ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet,” http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/ (accessed October 
25, 2007). 
4 NATO, “NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan,” 
http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html (accessed October 22, 2007). 
5 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient (Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute for International Studies, [2005]), 
www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf (accessed November 4, 2007). 
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maintained with all external interfaces, which are mainly civilian actors. Heavy PRTs can 
cover these demands better than light PRTs.6 Therefore, the “inherent capabilities [of the 
heavy PRT] guarantee a systematic and coordinated development process.”7 Brandstetter 
argues that light PRTs, such as the former UK PRT in Mazar-i Sharif and the U.S.-led 
PRTs, are too short on personnel to provide the requisite capabilities. Their main 
constraint is the shortfall in Information Operation capabilities, which hampers effective 
use of the media for information, education and influence.8 
Myriame Bollen et al. briefly discuss the origins of the PRT concept and the 
operational objectives in general. They assert that it is still an evolving concept and point 
out that structures, capabilities and approaches differ due to the lead nations’ distinct 
policies and the environmental circumstances that the various PRTs are operating in.9 
They recognize the PRT’s capacity “as a future model for peace building and 
development beyond Afghanistan.”10 
Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers emphasize the strategic level and relate 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) to the introduction and role of the PRTs. Whereas SSR 
represents the responsibility of the governments of the U.S., the UK, Italy, Japan and 
Germany to improve conditions in one particular sector due to national interests, the 
PRTs focus on stability and reconstruction efforts with the short term goal of establishing 
a safe and secure environment as a prerequisite for the SSR. Noetzel and Scheipers argue 
that neither a joint strategy nor a common concept for PRTs have been agreed upon.11  
                                                 
6 Gerd Brandstetter, Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort, [2005]). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Myriame T. I. B. Bollen, Eric T. Linssen and Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, “Are PRTs Supposed to 
Compete with Terrorists?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no. 4 (December 2006), 438. 
10 Ibid., 446. 
11 Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers, Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing Or 
Disunity? (London: Chatham House, [2007]). 
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2. Execution of PRT Activities 
Michael McNerney focuses on PRTs as an organizational model to conduct 
security and reconstruction (S&R) operations. From 2002, when the U.S. developed the 
PRT model to enhance ISAF visibility throughout the country, to 2005, he systematically 
assesses the success of the PRTs along three criteria. These criteria are coordination, 
relationship-building and capacity-building.  He defines coordination with international 
civilian actors, in a military-dominated environment, as a crucial and absolutely 
necessary measure for success. Relationship and capacity-building refer to the internal 
structures of the host-nation, such as local leadership structures plus government and 
administration capabilities.12 These measures of effectiveness are more suitable than 
quantifying “funds spent and the number of assistance projects completed”13 because the 
latter approach does not assess the impact of these projects and does not consider whether 
they fit into the broader political, economic and military strategy for Afghanistan’s 
future. Additionally, McNerney refers to the U.S.-led PRTs, to the UK-led PRT in 
Mazar-i Sharif and to the German-led PRT in Konduz. The circumstances today differ 
from those in 2005 due to the establishment of another German force structure in the 
north. This means that the methodology McNerney used is still applicable, but his 
conclusions have been overtaken by events.  
Paul Gallis of the Congressional Research Service provides arguments about the 
functions, operational approach, and objectives of the NATO-led ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan. He offers a political analysis regarding the participating nations, including 
their caveats.14 He assesses the policies of the main participating nations and explains 
their strategic and operational approach as well as their understanding of the PRTs. He 
covers Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the U.S. 
                                                 
12 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a 
Muddle?” Parameters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 35. 
13 Ibid., 39. 
14 Paul Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, [2007]). 
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Myriame Bollen et al. provide insight into the security commitments of the PRTs 
in combination with a discussion of the perceptions of these actions among civilians, both 
NGO personnel and Afghans. They differentiate between precise military viewpoints and 
the perceptions of the international aid community, namely the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) and the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB). All of the above mentioned 
NGOs have serious concerns about the merged approach of development and security as 
the basic concept of the PRTs.15 “This [perception of the NGOs] is crucial to assessing 
the effectiveness of PRTs, since security is one of their main stated roles.”16 The authors 
explain the importance of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterviolence and 
poppy eradication operations in an effort to increase stability and security. Their main 
argument is that the military has the capability to engage in more violent conflicts and 
deal with hot spots, because of its training, equipment and weapons. Thus, ‘milder’ 
means of CT [counter terrorism], such as gathering intelligence in order to prevent 
surprise attacks”17 are too undemanding for the PRTs. Unless a stable environment is 
established, all other actions of the PRTs, especially the reconstruction measures, are 
ineffective and have no lasting impact. Therefore, the authors conclude that the 
requirement of “preventively and actively chasing terrorists with specialist forces”18 is a 
self-evident task of the PRTs. Additionally, as a side-effect, the acceptance and 
credibility of the presence of the PRTs would rise among the population, and this would 
be a fundamental contribution to force protection.  
Touko Piiparinen, who served as a political representative within the Norwegian-
led PRT in Meymaneh between 2005 and 2006, focuses on the internal relationship, 
                                                 
15 Myriame T. I. B. Bollen, Linssen and Rietjens, Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists,? 
442. 
16 Ibid., 441. 
17 Ibid., 446. 
18 Ibid., 446. 
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structure and decision-making of military and civilian sections within the PRT.19 He 
attempts to “understand those inter-subjective rules and organizational conventions that 
enable and constrain the decision-making of PRTs.”20 He emphasizes the gap between 
the military officials and civilian crisis management experts from a social standpoint and 
describes how different mindsets lead to different assessments. Moreover, while referring 
to the main objectives of the PRTs, disarmament in particular, he discusses a case of 
rivalries between the Jumbesh and Azadi tribes in Faryab province, and shows how a 
civilian approach could promote a sustainable peace process with long-term stability.21 
His main argument is that the PRTs should act as modern civil-military organizations, 
based on a consensus regarding decision-making and on precise definitions of roles and 
functions within the PRT leading to the highest degree of cooperation. After this basic 
concept is established, national interests and caveats, announced within NATO as the 
superior organization, have to be defined, and finally, the PRT could be placed in the 
multinational environment.22 
3. Political Factors  
The two previous sub-sections focus on internal arguments regarding PRTs 
whereas the following paragraphs provide arguments regarding external aspects of PRTs. 
Thomas H. Johnson, in his article “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The 
State of State-Building after War,” discusses the Bonn Agreement23 and the subsequent 
                                                 
19 Touko Piiparinen, “A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider's Account of Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (February 2007), 143. 
20 Ibid., 143. 
21 Ibid., 145. 
22 Ibid., 155. 
23 The Bonn Agreement was the result of a conference held in Bonn, Germany, in which the “intense 
diplomacy of the United Nations and the United States got key parties to agree to a conference to name an 
interim administration and chart the future political transitions. The meeting began … on November 27 and 
included representatives from four main Afghan groupings: the various factions of the Northern Alliance; 
the Rome group, composed of the family and supporters of the former King Zahir Shah; the Peshawar 
group, Pashtun mujahedin, tribal and religious leaders based in Pakistan; and the Cyprus group, a mixture 
of factions with close ties to Iran.” Antonio Donini, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester, Nation-Building 
Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 44-45. 
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nation-building process and argues that the Bonn Agreement left essential factors 
unconsidered, such as the representation of moderate Taliban within the interim and 
transitional government and the unresolved question of the role of regional warlords, who 
have continued to be active since the fall of the Taliban regime.24 Additionally, Johnson 
provides a useful insight into the Afghan Constitution, with its major provisions 
concerning the role of the president, the form of the legislature, the supreme court, and 
the contribution to women’s equality. He posits that the constitution has been too vague 
to establish democracy successfully.25 Finally, he stresses the importance of the elections 
and the balanced representation of ethnic groups, especially between the Pashtuns and the 
Tajiks. He also states that President Karzai “recognized the extremely difficult task of 
assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups while meeting the 
country’s desperate need for professional governance after years of ruinous conflict.”26 
4. Economic Factors  
The Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment provides hard data on Afghanistan’s 
economy, which has grown in recent years. However, this growth has to be seen in 
relation to the pre-conflict period. During the years of Soviet occupation, from 1979 to 
1988, the subsequent civil war, and the rule of the Taliban regime, a functional economy 
was eroded. Thus, economic growth under the Karzai administration has been 
tremendous, with growth rates up to approximately 13 percent. Nevertheless, Afghanistan 
is an economic dwarf. The main economic sector is agriculture. Crop shortfalls are, 
however, not unusual due to droughts. Moreover, farmland is limited owing to the 
mountainous topography and the plague of landmines inherited from the Soviet 




                                                 
24 Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After 
War,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 1/2 (March-June, 2006), 22. 
25 Ibid., 10. 
26 Ibid., 8. 
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donations, especially in the economic sector. Excluding the financial obligations to 
Russia, Afghanistan suffers from a debt burden that amounted to nearly 13 percent of the 
GDP in 2005.27 
Christopher Blanchard elaborates on Afghanistan’s opium economy. He analyzes 
the roles of the farmers, landowners and traffickers who want to benefit from opium 
cultivation and also the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regarding production and 
logistical support.28 By stating that “militia commanders, criminal organizations, and 
corrupt officials have exploited narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and 
patronage,”29 he establishes the relationship between opium production and security in 
general. Opium cultivation increased in 2006 and 2007, especially in the south-western 
region, concurrently with more activities of the Taliban; Afghanistan today provides 93 
percent of the world’s supply of opium.30  
5. Societal and Cultural Factors  
Afghanistan is a deeply fragmented country. Instead of a central government, 
regional powerbrokers influence the majority of the population, which basically inhabits 
the rural areas. Among the easily-identified twenty-five different groups, a huge ethnic 
and linguistic diversity prevails. The four largest ethnicities are Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, 
and Hazara. The Pashtun tribe is the most important one and encompasses approximately 
45 percent of the entire Afghan population. All these groups are regionally concentrated 
due to the geographic circumstances of the country.31 
                                                 
27 Jane's Information Group, Economy, Afghanistan Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, [2007]) 
(accessed April 26, 2007).; Jane's Information Group, Natural Resources, Afghanistan Jane's Sentinel 
Security Assessment,[ 2007]) (accessed April 26, 2007). 
28 Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (Washington DC: Congessional 
Research Service, [2007]), www.crsdocuments.com (accessed September, 27 2007). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Government Formation and PerformanceCongressional Research 
Service, [2007]) (accessed July 19, 2007). 
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The Center for Strategic and International Studies published, in October 2007, a 
fact-paper by Anthony H. Cordesman entitled The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The 
Afghan Pakistan War in which facts and figures regarding the relationship between 
Pashtun-dominated areas and increased insurgency activities are provided. Moreover, 
data from different polls from December 2006 and more recently on ethnic, linguistic and 
sectarian differences are reported. Cordesman also discusses the relationship between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding the Pashtun tribe in the borderland areas as well as 
different polls dealing with Pakistani opinion on Islamic extremism, the war conducted 
by the coalition pursuing Taliban and Al-Qaeda sympathizers, and related factors.32  
Revolution Unending by Gilles Dorronsorio provides a deeper and more precise 
analysis focusing on Afghan society from 1973 to the present. He holds that Afghanistan 
was, in the 1970s, on a prosperous development track and that the occupation by the 
Soviet Union could have been prevented. He uses the terms “an alien society” and “an 
imaginary country” to underline his arguments about a tribal revolt and ethnic war. 
Moreover, he discusses the controversial cultural, military and religious aspects of 
Afghanistan’s conflicts.33 
6. Security Situation  
Feroz H. Khan, in his article “Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 
contributes several insights regarding the long lasting tensions between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and explains the rise and fall of the Taliban. The conflict between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan dates from the division of the Pashtuns in 1893 by the Durand Line and the 
establishment of Pashtun nationalism, called Pashtunwali, which developed in the first 
half of the twentieth century. This smoldering conflict has continued until the present 
                                                 
32 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War (Washington, 
DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), [2007]), www.csis.org/burke (accessed 
October 22, 2007). 
33 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia 
University Press in association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2005), 370. 
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time as a destabilizing factor, and it was decisive in the rise of the Taliban.34 The author 
attributes the sobering security situation to factors such as “conflicting group-identities, 
narcotics trade, small arms highways, money laundering, mineral smuggles and cultural 
clashes.”35 
The security situation in Afghanistan has recently been shaken by an increased 
number of insurgency activities, primarily conducted by the Taliban, beginning in mid-
2006. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason discuss in their article, “Understanding 
the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” safe havens in Pakistan’s border areas that 
have been utilized by the Taliban, the tribal understanding of the Pashtuns’ code of 
honor, and the influence of Islamic scholars, especially in rural areas, to maintain the 
support and ability to continue insurgencies to destabilize Afghanistan. The authors deem 
the number of PRTs throughout the country as too little and they note that the ratio 
between military personnel and local inhabitants is the most insufficient of any recent 
post-conflict missions (i.e., Bosnia or Kosovo). Moreover, the authors hold that not only 
are the Taliban active, but also the Islamic movement Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbudin 
Hekmatyar.36 In their view, “Afghanistan is anything but a stable country.”37 The article 
rejects the superficial view of the Taliban as merely terrorist while analyzing the tribal 
circumstances in which they are operating. They conclude that an intensified support of 
NATO is necessary, including a significantly increased number of PRTs throughout the 
country, to win the counter-insurgency. They also suggest a variety of requirements that 
have to be fulfilled by the Afghan government, the United Nations, NGOs and other 
donors for a successful conclusion to OEF.38  
                                                 
34 Feroz H. Khan, Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan (Monterey, CA: Center for 
Contemporary Conflict (CCC), [2003]), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/jan03/southAsia.asp (accessed 
October 31 2007). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan,” Orbis 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 71. 
37 Ibid., 72. 
38 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan,” 88. 
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7. Literature Assessment  
The literature includes a huge variety of sources on Afghanistan and current 
commitments and operations by international organizations in this country. However, the 
literature dealing with the PRTs, in particular, is spare, preliminary and limited because 
the concept of the PRTs is relatively new. The U.S. developed the concept in 2002, 
NATO adopted it in 2003, and each nation understands it differently. Additionally, 
NATO expanded its presence from 2003 to 2006 with several PRTs throughout 
Afghanistan, which means that a fundamental operational change took place before 
troop-contributing nations were able to gain extensive experience. Consequently, the 
evaluative and assessment literature is not currently representative and covers only the 
initial stages of the PRTs. Nevertheless, various reports, documentations and descriptions 
are available. In addition, literature dealing with Afghanistan itself, including political, 
economic, societal and cultural aspects, is abundant. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
1. Methodology  
This thesis focuses on German and U.S.-led PRTs currently deployed in 
Afghanistan. By conducting case studies of the designated PRTs, their performance is 
assessed. The assessment follows four criteria: capacity building, stability, relationship-
building, and aid projects and coordination.39 Detailed definitions of these criteria are 
provided in Chapter IV. Due to the qualitative and dynamic character of these criteria, the 
assessment reflects trends.40 The overall character of the thesis is explanatory and 
analytical. 
                                                 
39 In this thesis, capacity-building means the improvement of state capabilities such as administration, 
institutions, ANP, ANBP and ANA. Stability implies the perception of the security situation in the 
respective areas of the PRTs among officials, NGOs and the Afghan population. Relationship-building 
implies the establishment of relationships between military personnel and local key-decision makers and 
their subsequent impacts. Aid projects and coordination means the capability of the PRTs to establish 
conditions in which projects can be executed, to conduct small scale projects, to provide expertise for 
certain projects, as well as to exchange and share information of planned and current actions between 
military personnel of the designated PRTs and the respective civilian aid actors. 
40 Trends in this thesis means that an improvement in the respective criteria is reflected by a “+”, a 
deterioration by a “-” and a “0” signals no change. 
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2. Sources  
This thesis includes an assessment of the setbacks of the PRTs regarding the 
achievement of their goals. For this purpose, NATO’s quarterly reports about ISAF to the 
UN, unclassified situation reports of the designated PRTs, UNAMA reports, NGO reports 
and CRS reports are consulted.  
3. Thesis Content  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the analytical framework 
in which the PRTs are effective. PRTs are only a contributing asset and part of a 
composition of means that aim to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Therefore, it is of 
utmost importance to see the PRTs in the context of the overall political process. 
In Chapter III, the case studies of the German and U.S.-led PRTs, which are the 
subject of the investigation, are introduced, and the conceptual understanding and 
approach of the PRT’s lead nations are described. Finally, the mission statements and the 
objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical level are discussed. This and the 
previous chapter are essentially descriptive. 
Chapter IV assesses the setbacks of the PRTs. Due to increased Taliban activities 
since mid-2006, among other factors, the PRTs have not yet met their goals.  
Chapter V analyzes factors that influence the approach and actions of the PRTs to 
explain why the assessed setbacks have occurred. Within this chapter, the focus is not 
only on the armed opposition of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, poppy growing, and the 
overall security situation, but also on government, economic, and socio-cultural issues. 
This chapter is analytical. 
Chapter VI offers conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Afghanistan has been a corridor, base, or buffer for other powers or adjacent 
countries seeking their own interests and benefits for centuries. Alexander the Great, in 
the second century, was not the first invader of Afghanistan, but he was daring and brave 
enough to conquer this rangy, rugged and muddy land, with strong winters and hot 
summers, to establish and consolidate his empire against the Persians. He learned about 
the Hindukush and the tribes and gained even more experience on his way back from 
India. He was followed, for instance, by the Huns, Genghis Khan and his Mongols, the 
Moghuls, as well as the British, the Soviet Union and also Iran, Pakistan and India. All of 
them tried to alienate and utilize Afghanistan for their interests and purposes.41 The 
British paid a high price, especially during the first and second Anglo-Afghan Wars in the 
nineteenth century when they were not able to establish direct rule over Afghanistan and 
lost a lot of their sons. Additionally, the Soviet Union had been defeated in a Cold War 
scenario by the mujahideen who fought their jihad and applied guerrilla warfare 
techniques. Both, the British and the Soviets painfully experienced what it means to 
occupy Afghanistan. 
“For the United States, September the 11th, 2001, cut a deep dividing line in our 
history, a change of eras as sharp and clear as Pearl Harbor or the first day of the Berlin 
blockade. There can be no lasting security in a world at the mercy of terrorists for my 
nation or for any nation. Given this threat, NATO's defining purpose -- our collective 
defense -- is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the 
war against global terror. . . . In this war, we defend not just America or Europe; we are 
defending civilization itself.”42 Immediately after the disasters of 9/11, an undisputed and 
                                                 
41 Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia, ed. Palgrave Macmillan 
(London; New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks: Distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 9-36. 
42 Federal News Service, “In Bush's Words: A New Call to Mutual Defense,” The New York Times, 
May 24, 2002 (accessed January 18, 2008). 
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common consensus prevailed among the international community43 regarding the 
commitment against International Terrorism. This consequently led to the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the United States in October 2001. 
We now recognize the commitment of the international community to stabilize 
and rebuild Afghanistan after years of civil war and the reign of the Taliban regime. The 
rebuilding of Afghanistan is a combination of civil-military activities embedded in an 
overarching political process. The international community has learned their lessons from 
history and practices a light footprint on the ground to avoid impressions of occupation. 
The former UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, recommended this approach in 2001 regarding the presence of military forces.44  
The U.S.-led coalition of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) consisted, in the 
early stages, of eighteen45 troop-contributing nations. After the U.S. invaded Afghanistan 
in October 2001, the initial high intensity war-fighting phase of late 2001 was shortly 
finished. Subsequently, during the transition phase from high intensity war-fighting to 
stabilization operations, the U.S. designed a force presence avoiding “major troop 
deployments.”46 In this context and in the consideration of Brahimi’s recommendations, 
the Bonn Conference in Germany, in December 2001, was held. The primary aim of the 
                                                 
43 In this thesis, the term International Community means not only all in the nation-building process 
that involved countries on the political and military level, but also all organizations that provide aid of any 
kind to Afghanistan. These countries include Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are various IOs and 
NGOs which were coordinated by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and 
since 2007 NATO has gained coordination authority among those. 
44 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient, 8. 
45 Seventeen international troop-contributing nations according to U.S. Department of Defense, Office 
of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet - International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, [2002]), www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/d20020226icwt.pdf 
(accessed January 21, 2008) plus the United States. 
46 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient, 8. 
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Bonn Agreement47 was to establish a political roadmap to “promote national 
reconciliation, lasting peace, stability, and respects for human rights, as well as to 
cooperate with the international community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a 
base for terrorism.”48 Finally, a solid state founded on “a broad-based, gender sensitive, 
multi-ethnic and fully representative government”49 along with sufficient state capacity50 
and autonomy51 should be established. However, the agreement is not a peace agreement 
among the adversaries who fought the civil war previously.52 It has laid down the 
timeframe for national elections, the role of the United Nations in rebuilding Afghanistan, 
the reorganization of the Afghan military forces, the establishment of ISAF, and the 
introduction of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.53 Eventually, presidential elections 
took place on the ninth of October 2004, parliamentary elections on the nineteenth of 
September 2005, and the consensus of the Afghan constitution was promulgated on the 
fourth of January 2004.54 Unfortunately, the Bonn Agreement and the subsequent 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) have shown only limited success and are in permanent 
need of re-stimulation. 
                                                 
47 According to United Nations Security Council, “Press Release SC/7234,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7234.doc.htm (accessed January 28, 2008) the official name is 




50 According to Patrick H. O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 2nd ed. (New York, N.Y: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2007), 38-39. “Capacity is the ability of the state to wield power in order to carry out the 
basic tasks of security and reconciling freedom and equality.” 
51 According to Ibid., 39 “autonomy is the ability of the state to wield its power independently of the 
public.” 
52 Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada and Abby Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: 
Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations, [2005]), http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/cling-afg-apr05.pdf (accessed 
November 28, 2007). 
53 Johnson, Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War, 3. 
54 Ibid., 9. 
 18
ISAF still suffers from a low commitment in the deployment of troop personnel. 
“We need more time, more patience, and more commitment”55 to succeed in 
Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Army said, as the last commander of the 
Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan (CFC-A) on Bagram airfield on January 21, 
2007, when authority over all U.S. forces in Afghanistan was transferred to the Combined 
Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76). Moreover, the international community lacks a joint 
strategy of military operations and civil activities. NATO has not yet defined a common 
concept of PRTs that might be a compulsory prerequisite, to enhance the effectiveness of 
PRTs on the ground, as some authors claim.56  NATO’s approach is dominated by the 
lead-nation concept. Each nation has different understandings and interpretations of what 
PRT activities should be due to different political, economic and ethnic environments, 
and key figures, as well as different national mandates. Flexibility, instead of being a 
concept, is common sense among the participating nations. Thus, the PRTs are tailored to 
the respective needs of the Afghans and to the unique cultural environment in which the 
respective PRT becomes effective. 
This chapter is primarily descriptive and provides facts and figures about the 
goals and differences of OEF and ISAF. This is followed by the U.S., NATO and the 
German concepts and approaches in Afghanistan regarding the deployed PRTs. It should 
be noted that the following framework focuses only on military aspects of the overall 
rebuilding process in Afghanistan. 
B. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) VS. THE 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) 
Operation Enduring Freedom was launched as a U.S.-led coalition, as a result of 
the incidents of 9/11, with the invasion of Afghanistan on the seventh of October 2001, 
independent from the United Nations and NATO. Major combat operations consisted 
primarily of U.S. air strikes as well as the launching of cruise and Tomahaw missiles 
                                                 
55 U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, “Outgoing Commander Says U.S. 
Commitment Will Live on in Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, 
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2771 (accessed January 21, 2008). 
56 Noetzel and Scheipers, Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing Or Disunity,? 4. 
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from U.S. and British platforms targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces and accompanied 
by a relatively small footprint of ground troops during the initial stage. In this stage,   
Special Forces operations (SFO) were conducted with 1,000 personnel and approximately 
1,300 marines were deployed to the southern part of Afghanistan to conduct locally 
limited high intensity war-fighting against the Taliban forces around Kandahar. These 
major ground operations lasted from October to December 2001 and the ninth of 
December 2001 was the date when the Taliban regime surrendered. Unfortunately, the 
deployed forces were not capable of catching Osama bin Laden or the leadership of the 
Al-Qaeda network. Officially, major combat operations ended on the first of May 2003, 
after “Operation Anaconda”57 had finished. Consequently, the U.S. invasion defeated the 
Taliban regime and dispersed the Al-Qaeda network. Remnants of both groups still 
remain in Afghanistan although the OEF mission is still ongoing. U.S. ground forces 
were basically not involved in huge high intensity war-fighting, as were the forces of the 
Northern Alliance who fought side-by-side with the U.S.-led coalition forces.58 
The ISAF mission was initiated during the Bonn Agreement. The United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1386, promulgated on the twentieth of December 2001, 
declared the mission robust and allowed the use of lethal force due to the fact that the 
situation in Afghanistan posed and still poses “a threat to international peace and 
security.”59 The United Kingdom took the initial lead, whereas the mandate was limited 
to Kabul, and to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in 
Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the 
personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”60 Table 1 provides 
an overview of different aspects of both missions. 
                                                 
57 According to Kenneth Katzmann, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, [2007]) (accessed October 2, 2007) Operation Anaconda 
was the first major offensive operation since the invasion in 2001. It was conducted in early 2002 in the 
Shah-i-Kot Valley, south of Gardez, Paktia province against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. 
58 Ibid.; Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, ed. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), 43-44. 
59 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1386 (2001),” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (accessed January 28, 2008). 
60 Ibid. 
 20
Table 1.   Different Aspects of the OEF and ISAF Mission 
 OEF ISAF 
Legitimacy Self-defense61 UN-mandated (UNSCR 
1386 under chapter VII) 
NATO-led62 
Origins Combat mission63 Peacekeeping, assistance 
and stabilization mission64 
Aim Destroy Al-Qaeda network 
and overthrow Taliban 
regime65 
Assist the government of 
Afghanistan in the 
establishment and 
maintenance of a safe and 
secure environment, extend 
government authority and 
influence and facilitate 
reconstruction66 
Leadership in theatre U.S.-led HQ at Bagram 
airbase67 
NATO-led composite HQ 
in Kabul68 
Participating Nations France, Japan, South Korea 
and the United Arab 
Emirates69 
38 participating nations, 
including all NATO 
member states70 
Area of Operations Eastern and southern parts 
of Afghanistan71 
Initially limited to Kabul 
and since October 2003 
throughout Afghanistan72 
                                                 
61 Katzmann, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 7. 
62 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001), 2. 
63 Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, 1; Katzmann, Afghanistan: Post-
War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 20. 
64 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001), 2. 
65 Hodes and Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 43. 
66 NATO, ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet, 1. 
67 Hodes and Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 45. 
68 NATO, NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan, 5-6. 
69 Katzmann, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 20-21. 
70 NATO, ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet, 1. 
71 Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, 1 However, the mission is not 
limited to the physical borders of Afghanistan. 
72 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001), 2; NATO, NATO Briefing: Helping 
Secure Afghanistan, 5-6. 
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NATO strengthened its commitment after the United Nations asked, on behalf of 
the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, who requested NATO’s presence in Afghanistan.73 
The main issue was command, control and communication (C3) of ISAF and, therefore, 
the deployment and establishment of a permanent ISAF headquarters under NATO 
command. NATO’s commitment enabled smaller countries willing to participate, but not 
able to be a lead nation, into the force generation process of ISAF.74 NATO took over C3 
from ISAF on the eleventh of August 2003, and the planning of the phased expansion of 
NATO throughout the country began in October 2003 after the UNSCR 1510 had been 
promulgated, which gave permission to extend the force presence and influence beyond 
Kabul. The expansion was planned and conducted in four stages counter-clockwise 
throughout the countryside and started effectively in December 2003, at first in and 
around Kabul, where France became the lead nation, relieved Germany, and established 
the Regional Command Central (RCC).75 Subsequently, the expansion continued as in 
Figure 1, shown below, and was completed on the fifth of October 2006 when NATO 
assumed authority over the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and over the Regional Command 
East (RCE).76  
HQ RCE is collocated to the CJTF-76 at Bagram airbase, which is the 
headquarters for OEF and for all U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and also functions as a “de 
facto HQ”77 for RCE. Regarding planning and conducting operations under OEF, staffing 
tasks are received from ISAF HQ in Kabul, and it is reasonable to assume that this is a 





                                                 
73 Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, 3. 
74 NATO, NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan, 5. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Hodes and Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 45. 
77 Ibid., 45. 
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between OEF and ISAF, and stick to the respective mandates, due to a statement by the 
commander of CFC-A in October 2006, Lt.Gen. Karl Eikenberry, in which he said: “Our 
missions and forces on the ground remain unchanged.”78 
Figure 1.   The stages and timeline of NATO expansion in Afghanistan79 
 
The other ISAF Regional Commands are RC North (RCN) in Mazar-e Sharif 
under Germany, RC West (RCW) in Herat under Italy and RC South (RCS) in Kandahar, 
which is led by the United Kingdom.80 The lead nation concept has been applicable to the 
RCs and the PRTs since the involvement of NATO began.  
NATO defined the desired ISAF end-state in a letter dated 2 October 2003 from 
the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson at that time, to the United Nations as 
“self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government, in line with the relevant 
United Nations Security Council resolutions, able to exercise its authority and to operate 
throughout Afghanistan, without the need for ISAF to help provide security.”81  
                                                 
78 U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, “NATO Takes Lead for Operations 
throughout Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, 
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=1462 (accessed January 21, 2008). 
79 NATO, ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet, 2. 
80 Ibid. 
81 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2003 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 3. 
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The entire evolution of NATO in Afghanistan was accompanied by a series of 
renewed UNSCRs to legitimize the use of force and the presence in a sovereign country. 
This important point ensures, besides the fact that the impression of an occupying force is 
avoided in Afghanistan,82 a sufficient level of acceptance among the population of the 
respective troop-contributing nations. Especially among the European NATO members, 
the parliament, the parties, as well as the population execute domestic pressure on the 
governments. They see the danger of a mission creep from peacekeeping and stabilization 
toward high intensity war-fighting within counter-insurgency operations.83 Therefore, the 
existence of valid UNSCRs are essential, for instance, for Germany, where a national 
mandate of the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory to deploy armed forces 
outside the country and an approval of this would be very unlikely in the case of an 
expired UNSCR. The latest UNSCR is 1776 from September 19, 2007 and includes the 
United Nations’ support for OEF.84 
Consequently, OEF and ISAF are diametrically opposed missions with respect to 
their origins and objectives. Thus, completely different approaches, force formations, 
equipment, and leadership are necessary to achieve their respective goals. It is correct 
that the “range of military missions in Afghanistan encompasses everything from 
humanitarian to highly kinetic conventional and special operations,”85 however, 
regarding the big picture, it is, to a certain extent, useless to argue that “NATO and OEF 
forces have some degree of overlapping missions.”86 This becomes even more obvious 
with regard to their respective chains of command, in which no common points can be 
identified. NATO’s strategic HQ is Supreme Allied Command Operations (SACO) in 
Mons, Belgium and is in the lead for ISAF, whereas U.S. Centcom in Tampa, Florida is 
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the comparable HQ for OEF. Although both are commanded by U.S. four-star generals, 
SACO receives guidance out of and reports to NATO Military Command Structure 
(MCS) and U.S. Centcom is part of the U.S. national chain of command. Thus, the 
coordination of the two missions is challenging, although liaison elements are established 
in both HQs. Both missions touch each other in Afghanistan, especially in the eastern and 
southern parts of Afghanistan, however, they are conducted separately and, therefore, “it 
is important that NATO military authorities regularly review command and control 
arrangements with the aim to simplify and streamline existing command structures 
wherever and whenever possible.”87 Ultimately, coordination and cooperation are vital 
for the success of the military operations, but this has to be inter-communicative or in the 
words of the former Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson, “it is imperative that 
there be clear command and control arrangements between ISAF, OEF and PRTs.”88 
Simultaneously, the number of PRTs increased significantly with the expansion of 
ISAF throughout the country. The PRTs are the main civil-military asset, which conducts 
on the tactical level, stability operations and reconstruction projects and hence, combines 
military and civil activities in the regional environment. In the following sections, the 
different concepts, views and understandings of PRTs are discussed. 
C. U.S. CONCEPT OF PRTS 
U.S. officials developed the concept of PRTs in the summer of 2002. This in turn 
led to the establishment of the first U.S. PRT in Gardez, Paktia province under OEF in 
November 2002.89 Prior to this, the OEF mission had so-called Coalition Humanitarian 
Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams-Afghanistan (CAT-As) 
available, which supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction activities, 
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which were conducted by the civil aid organizations.90  The reconstruction efforts of the 
civil actors were limited, due to a lack of security throughout the country,91 and as 
already mentioned above, the U.S. wanted to avoid major troop deployments to 
Afghanistan for good historical reasons and additionally, due to their belief that a 
traditional peacekeeping approach would be fruitless in Afghanistan.92 Within this 
framework, the concept of PRTs was born as “small joint civil-military teams to expand 
the legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by 
supporting security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process.”93 In other 
words, the concept of PRTs was to spread the so-called “ISAF effect”94 throughout the 
countryside. 
PRTs consist mostly of military personnel, which amount to approximately 90-95 
percent, and the U.S. did not initially define any certain guidelines on how a PRT should 
be structured and which capabilities should be encompassed. The teams are tailored in 
size and composition to the local requirements and circumstances of the respective 
region, however, the concept implies a permanent presence of forces in the region, which 
is contradictory to OEF combat operations.95 PRTs play a role in stabilization and 
reconstruction measures and, therefore, they were originally called Joint Regional 
Teams.96 
The respective PRTs’ environments could, especially in the beginning in 2002, be 
characterized as highly volatile. The OEF mission was in its transition to the stabilization 
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phase, which, from a military perspective, is the most critical one. Thus, a large amount 
of flexibility was necessary to fit the PRTs into the respective environments where they 
could become most effective. This explains why the majority of the early organization 
charts of PRTs were dominated by military divisions and branches rather than other 
players, such as the “Afghan government, government organizations (e.g. USAID), State 
Department, NGOs, and UN,”97 which initially represented a secondary role. 
Due to the fact that the U.S. PRTs consist of low personnel strength (less than 
100), the concept’s main focus emphasizes force protection, self-defense, as well as quick 
impact assistance regarding the civil side to win local confidence and contribute to force 
protection.98 Although military tactical reserves, including the air assets of OEF, have 
been available in general, the PRTs had to rely on establishing liaisons and bargaining 
with regional key decision makers such as warlords, mullahs or regional commanders. 
Thus, the U.S.-led PRT has been more of a diplomatic asset with low enforcing 
capabilities.99  
The U.S. concept is based on the integration of civilian expertise to conduct 
reconstruction activities and pursue the goals of the security sector reform. Although 
there are often tensions between the military and civil side and the level of integration 
varies widely, agencies such as USAID, the U.S. Departments of Justice, Education, 
Agriculture and others have been involved.100 Additionally, it is important to stress that 
the Afghan government was involved in the development of this concept. They requested 
the change of name from Joint Regional Teams (JRTs) to PRTs and participated in 
coordination matters between PRTs and the governmental level of Afghanistan, basically 
represented by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.101 Thus, from the beginning of the 
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PRT concept, it was obvious that a high level of cooperation and coordination between 
the military and the civil actors was essential for success. Unfortunately, the established 
PRT Executive Steering Committee lost authority. It was to provide a platform for 
coordination measures among the Afghan government, UNAMA, ISAF, U.S. military 
representatives, and other donor countries. The same thing happened to the PRT Working 
Group on a different level. This was established on the HQ level of PRTs to enable an 
exchange of information. They suffered from both a low level of acceptance and 
ineffectiveness.102 
Another problem for PRTs was the lack of a clear definition of their role. PRT 
Working Guidelines103 or Principles104 were released by U.S. officials in which three 
main areas of activities were defined: reconstruction, central government support and 
stability. Thus, PRTs were not considered primarily military units conducting major 
combat operations to establish security, rather they were civilian-dominated groups 
pursuing developmental and political goals.105 This is the main difference between Civil-
Military-Cooperation (CIMIC) units deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, which 
conducted small scale reconstruction projects to support primarily military goals.106 
Although the U.S. concept of the PRTs enables flexibility to a large extent, it is extremely 
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security on the other hand, in a country with little stability between the relatively calm 
situation in the north and west but with a more volatile environment in the south and east 
of Afghanistan.107 
The next section shows how NATO has interpreted the PRT concept developed 
by the United States and how they gradually moved away from the original purpose of 
the PRTs. 
D. NATO’S ADOPTED CONCEPT OF PRTS 
NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, underscored the importance of 
NATO’s commitment in Afghanistan in his statement, “Afghanistan is a top priority for 
NATO.”108 NATO is, meanwhile, very involved, and has successfully spread the ISAF 
effect throughout the country and gained initial success in the deployment of PRTs to 
extend the authority of the central government in Kabul. The ISAF mission is the first 
commitment of NATO outside the so-called transatlantic area. Moreover, it is a test, but 
also a chance for NATO to prove its capabilities to counter threats such as asymmetric 
warfare, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.109 NATO will 
perform as well and as effectively as their member states’ level of ambition, and if NATO 
fails, the alliance will run into trouble. 
When NATO was beginning to expand throughout the country of Afghanistan in 
late 2003, they utilized the U.S. concept of PRTs and adopted it in a slightly different 
way. NATO preferred the alternative approach to the U.S. concept and used the British 
approach, which they had practiced in their PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province. This 
model pursued a primarily diplomatic approach based on negotiations rather than more 
military activities such as patrolling, and active support of the DDR and SSR processes. 
Thus, it is an active peace support or even enforcement model, which is legitimized by 
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the UNSCR 1386 and 1510110 as of October 13, 2003. Although it sticks to the 
integration of civilian actors to ensure the conduction of reconstruction efforts, NATO 
emphasizes the military capabilities of PRTs and hence, lays its main point of effort on 
security,111 although NATO did not change the requirements to do so. 
The British PRT varied not only in size, but also in its different focus on security 
rather than on civil affairs. Though PRTs are already more than five years in use, NATO 
has not yet determined a structure or organization chart or even defined capabilities. They 
developed the concept as a copy of the former British PRT in Mazar-e Sharif and related 
it after that to NATO’s PRT pilot project in Kunduz, where Germany has been in the lead 
position since June 2003. The former British PRT in Mazar-e Sharif consisted of less 
than 100112 personnel, whereas the PRT in Kunduz appears to have more than 450113 
servicemen excluding the civilian actors.  NATO’s understanding is that the PRTs have 
to be tailored to the demands of the regional environment regarding their size and 
composition, but the role of the PRTs, to first conduct military activities to produce 
stability and then, within this context, reconstruction measures, remains the same.114 In 
comparison to NATO’s understanding, the original role of PRTs, defined in the U.S. PRT 
Working Guidelines as of February 2003, focused on three main areas of activity. These 
were, in prioritized order, reconstruction, central government support, and stability.115 It  
 
 
                                                 
110 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1510 (2003) (New York: United Nations Security 
Council, [2003]), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html (accessed February 7, 2008). 
111 McHugh and Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in 
Afghanistan, 58. 
112 Brandstetter, Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort,? 7. 
113 12th German Contingent ISAF, National Briefing as of December 27, 2006, Mazar-e Sharif/AFG. 
114 Steve Mason, NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 
Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance (Canada: Peace Operations Working Group 
of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, [2003]), www.peacebuild.ca/whatsnew/PRT-
Dialogue-FinalReport.doc (accessed February 7, 2008). 
115 McHugh and Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in 
Afghanistan, 19. 
 30
is not enough that NATO has already changed the original role of a PRT; each lead 
nation in charge of a PRT interprets its role differently due to their respective national 
understanding and political landscape. 
The activities of PRTs under NATO command are clearly defined in ISAF’s 
operational plan as of 27 June 2004, in which a clear division between military and 
civilian actions has occurred.116 NATO defined terms of reference on 27 January 2005 in 
which the mission statement emphasizes security more than reconstruction for the first 
time. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and 
secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR and 
reconstruction efforts.”117 Thus, NATO’s strategy is three-fold, however, NATO stresses 
clearly that they play only the second role in creating a stable and secure environment 
due to the assisting and supporting nature of the ISAF missions.118 The first role in this 
context has been taken over by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National 
Police (ANP), which require continuous cooperation and coordination. Consequently, 
NATO has, under a revised operational plan, deployed the operational liaison and 
mentoring teams (OMLTs) to enhance the provision of security. These teams are 
assigned to different levels of ANA units and are responsible for coaching, 
accompanying and training of these units.119 However, they are not the focus of this 
thesis due to the fact that they were deployed effectively in 2006 and are thus, too new to 
be assessed from the perspective of the author. But they were definitely deployed because 
the PRTs have not been able to provide this training and mentoring to ANA, which 
means that the PRTs’ contribution to stability is, in this case, limited. Moreover, the 
OMLTs promote and stimulate again the SSR process where the U.S. is in charge of 
training the ANA. 
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According to ISAF’s PRT handbook, the purpose of PRTs is “to enhance stability 
in the provinces of Afghanistan.”120  NATO describes PRTs as a civil-military institution 
and a conflict-dissolving mechanism “able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure 
areas because of its military component and able to stabilize these areas because of the 
combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components.”121 In other 
words, PRTs enforce stability in the areas or provinces where necessary and then apply 
political, diplomatic, economic, and reconstruction measures to make sure that these 
areas do not slip back into conflict regions, and contribute therewith to a sustainable 
stable and secure situation. “The PRT is neither a combat nor a development institution. 
[…] The PRT is an interim institution designed for a specific purpose.”122 Therefore, a 
PRT can only be active in provinces where the situation is suitable regarding the 
capabilities of a PRT. A PRT requires a certain situation. This situation must be neither 
too volatile nor too stable and can be described as a transitional phase. Figure 2 shows the 
spectrum of intervention in which PRTs can engage. A situation more left or more right 
on the spectrum is inappropriate for PRTs. 
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Figure 2.   Spectrum of Engagement of PRTs123 
 
There are twenty-five PRTs currently in deployed in Afghanistan, all of which are 
under ISAF command.124 The PRTs are run by a lead nation, but are can be comprised  
of more nations, are subordinated under the Regional Commands (RC), which is 
equivalent to a Brigade-sized unit. This means that an RC is commanded by a one-star 
general whereas the PRT commanders are lieutenant colonels or colonels. ISAF HQ is 
located in Kabul and represents the highest tactical level in theatre. The operational level 
begins with the Joint Force Command North in Brunssum, the Netherlands, which again 
is subordinated to SACO in Mons, Belgium.125 Figure 3 provides an overview of the 
currently deployed PRTs in Afghanistan as of July 2007. 
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Figure 3.   Current PRTs in Afghanistan126 
 
NATO’s approach emphasizes flexibility, but the concept of PRTs serves multiple 
purposes for NATO. The acceptance of these small units among the NATO members is 
high and provides a suitable possibility for the smaller NATO members to participate in 
the ISAF mission with only a small contingent. However, this means that PRTs basically 
serve NATO’s interests and not Afghanistan’s, especially in sustaining the international 
engagement.127 Additionally, NATO’s commitment is accompanied by a lot of funding 
for Afghanistan, due to the fact that burden-sharing is an important point on NATO’s 
agenda and each participating nation provides a remarkable sum of money.128 
However, the more participants are involved, the harder it is to create a consensus, 
and the more challenging it is to coordinate all the actors. There are not only the 
participating nations with their military commitment, but also all the non-military actors 
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who conduct humanitarian relief, development, and nation-building activities. The 
UNAMA is primarily their representative and is to monitor and assist the implementation 
of the Bonn Agreement with all its facets. The UN’s Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Afghanistan provides guidance to the UNAMA, which thus plays 
or should play an important role in coordinating the activities of non-military actors. 
However, UNAMA has to rely on the voluntary willingness of the civilian actors to 
cooperate because the UN did not put obligations on the participating actors.129 
Consequently, the situation in Afghanistan regarding all actors is more than complex, and 
within this context, an absence of one real lead agency or nation for all actors of the 
international community prevails in a situation where coordination and cooperation is of 
utmost importance. These are only the objective facts, but additionally, personal 
resentments, sentiments, prejudices or even incompetence occur, which sometimes makes 
it impossible to cooperate with someone else. 
For coordination and guidance purposes, several institutions have been created. 
On the strategic level, the PRT Executive Steering Committee130 was established. 
Additionally, two more working groups subordinate to the committee were created. First, 
the PRT Working Group,131 which is to coordinate and discuss operational issues of the 
respective PRTs, especially regarding civil-military activities, and secondly, the NGO 
Civil Military Working Group,132 which should facilitate communication between NGOs, 
military forces and the Afghan government. In the latter group, the Agency Coordinating 
Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) plays an important role as the main NGO coordination 
                                                 
129 Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability 
Reference Document, 54-55. 
130 Chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and further participants are the Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development, COM ISAF, COM OEF (both co-chairs), the Special 
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, UNAMA, NATO’s Senior Civilian 
Representative, ambassadors of PRT contributing countries and occasionally representatives of other 
contributing nations. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient, 15. 
131 Chaired by the Ministry of Interior and other members are UNAMA’s civil-military coordinator, 
representative of OEF HQ and ISAF HQ as well as representatives of embassies of contributing nations. 
Ibid. 
132 Chaired by the UNAMA’s Civil-Military Coordinator and further composed of several 
representatives from different NGOs, military participants from OEF and ISAF as well as representatives of 
UNAMA and the Afghan government. Ibid. 
 35
body located in Kabul.133 These coordination forums can be seen as remarkable efforts 
with a willingness to coordinate civil and military activities and are known as “3-Ds” 
(defense, development and diplomacy) or “whole of government approaches” or in terms 
of the UN “integrated missions.”134 Furthermore, from an external viewpoint, it is 
reasonable to expect that an efficient teamwork would occur and prevail. However, these 
expectations are too simplistic and too high. Despite good intentions and a desire to help 
the Afghan people as common sense, coordination between the civil and military sides 
often clashes without fruitful results due to diametrically opposed approaches and 
understandings of civil and military strategies. Finally, information-sharing is the sole 
result that occurs from these coordination efforts, which is definitely too little to gain 
synergies.135 Ultimately, security forces continue to conduct winning-hearts-and-minds 
projects as a kind of neighborhood support, although these activities are not authorized 
and do not fit in the overall reconstruction efforts of a PRT.136 These efforts can lead to 
confusion among the population and to blurring effects between military forces and aid 
workers, especially when when aid workers appear in the same place and intend to 
conduct the same or even contradictory activities. The coordination between ISAF and 
OEF activities is also challenging, as a U.S. PRT commander once stated, “We do not 
want the State Department representative to meet with a tribal leader in the morning and 
have that person arrested by an Army Special Forces Team in the afternoon.”137 
E. GERMANY’S CONCEPT OF PRTS 
Germany’s national parliament (Bundestag) mandated the establishment of its 
first PRT in Kunduz, Kunduz province, on October 24, 2003 and transferred the authority 
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to NATO in December 2003.138 This PRT was the pilot project for NATO. Germany’s 
large commitment in Afghanistan, prior to NATO’s expansion, is based on its strong ties 
to the trans-Atlantic alliance as a fundamental pillar in German security policies and the 
self-evident support of other NATO member-states. However, the increased engagement 
can also be seen as a substitute for the deployment of German forces to Iraq due to the 
policy of the former German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, who stated “Kunduz instead 
of Baghdad.”139 
The German concept differs from the U.S. concept and it is not solely a military 
one, but rather a consensus among four different ministries of the German government. 
Therefore, Germany has released its Afghanistan concept of the German government in 
which the intra-ministerial strategy is defined.140 The relevant ministries are the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of the Interior (MoI) 
and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC). The entire 
concept represents an intra-ministerial venture; however, there is a clear distinction 
between the military and civil chains of command.141 The German PRTs are comprised 
of two commanders, the military commander, usually a colonel, is the head of all military 
assets and receives guidance not only from the national chain of command, but also from 
ISAF HQ via the respective RC. All German military assets are TACOM142 under COM 
ISAF, which imposes some limitations on COM ISAF regarding tasking these units. A 
representative of the MoFA is usually at the head of the civilian side of the PRT. This 
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team is supported by a representative of the MoEC who provides recommendations and 
coordination measures of all development and reconstruction activities.143 This structure 
is the result of the German constitution, in particular the German understanding of the 
‘primacy of politics’ especially in military issues, which makes it impossible to 
subordinate other ministries or agencies under the authority of a military command. 
Additionally, there is no possibility within the PRT for the military commander to task 
civil activities, although there are coordination talks on a regular basis. 
The German concept describes the activities of the PRTs as primarily diplomatic 
work in the form of establishing liaisons to key decision makers in the respective regions, 
conducting dialogues to convince and strengthen the local population, as well as enabling 
and supporting the activities of the UNAMA. Secondly, the PRTs should focus on 
security by supporting the SSR and finally, conduct development and reconstruction in 
accordance with other international and national actors in this sector.144 Although 
political efforts are in the foreground, the military size of the German PRTs is larger than 
the U.S. PRTs; the main difference is that the U.S. PRTs show up with a unity of 
command, whereas in the German PRTs, a strict division between the military and the 
civil chains of command prevail. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the evolution of the PRT concept from the U.S., NATO and 
German viewpoints is described. It is of utmost importance to understand that the PRTs 
in Afghanistan are only a small contributor or enabler in an overall political process. 
Moreover, the original intentions as well as the goals and objectives, determined by the 
first document, the Bonn Agreement, have to be kept in focus. Within the political 
framework, further processes such as the SSR, DDR and the PRTs have evolved.  
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It is the nature of these commitments that the original focus blurs over time and 
missions creep; a smooth shift to other objectives takes place. However, PRTs can only 
conduct satisfying work when they pursue goals for which they have been originally 
structured and for which they are enabled. Otherwise they are overworked. The message 
of this chapter is that the blades of the scissor are disintegrated; on one side are the 
original intention and purpose, and on the other side are the current tasks and activities, 
due to the understanding of the respective lead nation, although they are all subordinated 
under COM ISAF. 
Flexibility regarding the structure, capabilities and also the activities of the PRTs 
is compulsory due to the unique environment that they are acting in. The PRTs have to be 
tailored to meet the needs of the respective Afghan population. Therefore, a consensus on 
a common structure or even a common joint strategy is not necessary. The respective lead 
nation knows the goals and what to do to rebuild Afghanistan. If not, several documents, 
beginning with the Bonn Agreement or the different UNSCR exist to double-check the 
overarching objectives. However, when flexibility is used to serve the needs of the lead 
nation due to resource shortfalls, the international community represented by the UN and 
NATO has to intervene. 
The main arguments in this chapter are. 
• The political outcome of the Bonn Agreement does not provide a solid 
base for the establishment of a long-lasting democracy. Furthermore, it is 
exhausted and does not offer more space for improvement. The 
constitution as one outcome of the Bonn Agreement, especially, is too 
vague. 
• The SSR suffers from its multi-sectoral approach and from the absence of 
one lead agency as all sectors are deeply intertwined with each other. 
• The OEF and ISAF missions are diametrically opposed and face huge 
challenges to combine their efforts. 
• The United States developed the concept of the PRTs in 2002 to be able to 
conduct primarily small scale reconstruction projects to win the hearts and 
minds of the local Afghan population and to avoid major troop 
deployments to Afghanistan. The overall intention was to limit the 
operational footprint. 
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• NATO’s and Germany’s concept of the PRTs differs from the original 
concept of the U.S. without addressing structural and enabling 
requirements. 
• Different roles of the PRTs prevail. 
The next chapter conducts case studies of the U.S. and German-led PRTs in 
particular as part of the overall political process. A detailed description of the U.S. and 
German-led PRTs is offered, including not only their mission statements, structure and 
approach, but also their respective environments as well as the general policy of the 
respective lead nation and its national caveats. 
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III. U.S. AND GERMAN CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
All currently deployed PRTs in Afghanistan represent unique compositions of 
civil and military personnel including different military activities and reconstruction 
efforts. Due to the lead nation system, national policies prioritize projects and approaches 
rather than the tactical chain of command in theatre. Often, the available funding for 
PRTs is linked to specific purposes or certain projects, which are pre-determined by the 
respective donor. Consequently, the lessons learned prevail, which have to be analyzed in 
the respective context of the PRTs. 
The theoretical framework is discussed in the previous chapter; however, the 
reality is different and situations, structures and capabilities, which cannot be found in the 
concepts, often prevail. Of course, the perceptions differ due to other viewpoints, cultural 
values and intentions. “Lt. Col. James Bramble, a reservist from El Paso, Tex., with a job 
there as a pharmaceuticals executive, […] going to the nearby village of Morad Khan 
Kalay. He is a thoughtful man commanding a NATO provincial reconstruction team, 
[…], at a base in Qalat. His team is supposed to deliver the development and good 
governance that will marginalize the Taliban.”145 “No! No,” says Sardar Mohammed, [an 
Afghan local official] stepping forward. “We don’t trust the governor. If he gets food, he 
gives it to 10 families. He puts money in his pocket. We trust you more than him. Bring 
aid directly to us.”146 Then again is another point of view, of an Afghan official, 
Mahmoud Saikal who is involved in the central government in Kabul in security and 
development. “I used to think that devoting myself was the best way to help the country, 
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right first. It feels like we haven’t made any progress at all in the last six years, like we’re 
back in Taliban times.”147 These impressions could be continued with further different 
perceptions. 
Consequently, not only do the PRTs vary internally, but also the perception and 
the impact of PRTs is different. The Afghans expect certain things from the PRTs, mostly 
security and development. Therefore, the overall question of this chapter is to what extent 
the internal structure and the capabilities of the German and U.S.-led PRTs enable an 
effective addressing of these needs. The main argument is that the PRTs’ capabilities and 
capacities are limited and can only maintain gained successes over a certain period of 
time. 
The U.S. developed the PRT concept whereas Germany provided the pilot project 
of NATO’s PRTs. The U.S. PRTs are deployed in the conflict-ridden eastern parts of 
Afghanistan where the Pashtuns are dominant. The situation in the east demands a more 
robust deployment and equipment of forces, whereas Germany’s PRTs are in the northern 
region where a more calm and stable situation prevails. Due to an ethnic diversity 
between Uzbeks, Tajiks and also Pashtuns in the north, the situation is more complex and 
challenging regarding diplomacy and liaison. These two poles on a spectrum of war-
fighting intensity and ethnical diversity offer sufficient lessons learned for NATO PRTs 
in Afghanistan. No PRT in this spectrum provides more lessons identified or learned than 
the U.S. and German PRTs do. 
B. U.S. CASE STUDY 
1. U.S. PRTs 
The U.S. currently has twelve PRTs deployed in Afghanistan under the banner of 
ISAF and NATO command.148 Ten of them are under the command of RCE where Maj. 
Gen. D. Rodriguez, U.S. Army, is in charge, and who is also the commander of OEF and 
the national commander for all U.S. troops in Afghanistan. One U.S. PRT is located in 
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Qalat, Zabol province under the leadership of RCS, and another U.S. PRT is RCW’s area 
of responsibility in Farah, Farah province.149 Table 1 provides an overview of all 
deployed U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan, and their locations, as of October 2007. The U.S. 
personnel strength as of October 2007 has been more than 15,000 servicemen for ISAF 
and thus, the U.S. has been the largest troop contributor in the commitment in 
Afghanistan.150 
Table 2.   Location of U.S. PRTs151  
 Location Province Command and Control 
1 Asadabad Konar RCE 
2 Bagram Parvan RCE 
3 Farah Farah RCW 
4 Gardez Paktia RCE 
5 Ghazni Ghazni RCE 
6 Jalalabad NangarharRCE 
7 Khowst Khowst RCE 
8 Mether Lam Laghman RCE 
9 Nuristan Nuristan RCE 
10 Panjshir (Jabal o-Saraj)152Panjshir RCE 
11 Qalat Zabol RCS 
12 Sharana Paktika RCE 
2. Mission 
The mission for each PRT is given by COM ISAF and is defined in the PRT’s 
Terms of Reference as Appendix 2 of ISAF’s PRT handbook.153 The mission statement 
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is already mentioned in chapter II-F of this thesis, however, it is important to emphasize 
additionally that the mission statement is not only of military origin, but  encompasses 
both  military and  political dimensions. The mission statement was agreed upon on 27 
January 2005 by the PRT Executive Steering Committee.154 Finally, the mission 
statement can be reduced to three main objectives, which are governance, security, and 
reconstruction, whereas beyond “this basic guidance, the essential tasks of the PRT were 
left open to allow them flexibility to adapt to local conditions.”155  
As U.S. PRTs consist of fewer personnel, and are capable of conducting self-
defense as well as force protection measures, the U.S. commanders understand their 
primary goal is in assisting the central government and ensuring its influence in the 
provinces. Their primary effort is governance and diplomacy. Consequently, the 
provincial governor and the police chief are assisted and supported in ruling  the policies 
of Kabul. This means that in practice, military commanders have to personally appear 
with the respective governor or official police chief to show and underscore the 
relationship with each other as well as with other local officials. These activities send 
deterrence messages to warlords, religious leaders and tribal elders not to hamper Kabul’s 
policies. As long as there are competent officials in charge who are in line with the 
central government in Kabul, this system is and will be successful. However, when 
former warlords, regional power brokers, corrupt officials or even incompetent 
personalities with dubious motives pursuing their own interests or unable to conduct the 
necessary rule occur in the respective office, the system fails. Of even greater danger is 
the possibility of getting mixed up with these disloyal and questionable personalities.156 
This would consequently lead to a non-acceptance of the presence of international 
military forces and to illegitimate officials. Subsequently, the power would shift to other 
power holders, which would destabilize the situation further and endanger the 
international military forces. Therefore, the PRT has to identify and screen all official and 
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non-official key decision makers in their respective AOR. For this purpose it is important 
not only to gather intelligence information, but also to have access to more background 
information and analyzing capabilities. Furthermore, recommendations have to be 
provided to the central government in Kabul to replace governors or other officials if 
necessary. 
The second field of PRT activities for U.S. commanders is security. Due to the 
fact that the military component of U.S. PRTs is often only a platoon-sized unit, the main 
focus is self-defense and force protection157 although a tactical reserve in theatre, 
including air assets, is generally available. This means that PRT personnel can be 
escorted as well as the PRT facilities can be protected, however, an active promotion of 
security by pursuing elements of the SSR cannot be conducted. Consequently, one of the 
two major pillars of the PRT concept, security, neglected though the entire ISAF mission 
becomes an assisting mission, which calls primarily for the Afghan security forces to 
establish and maintain security. To coordinate the activities between Afghan security 
forces and the PRTs, a Governor’s Provincial Security Committee was established, which 
is held on a monthly basis and is to share information and coordinate operations.158  
However, the U.S. PRT security forces are not able to establish long-term stability or 
security to create situations in which other activities or projects could be carried out. A 
secure and stable environment is not only part of ISAF’s mission   statement, but also a 
fundamental prerequisite for conducting reconstruction and nation-building efforts. 
Therefore, the international community established Operational Mentoring and Liaison  
 
Teams (OMLTs), Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and PRT Military Police Teams 
(PMPTs) to speed up or at least facilitate the creation of effective and robust Afghan 
security forces and their training. 
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Figure 4 provides an example of the ETTs assigned to the third (AFG) 
Mechanized BDE, which shows that although the United States is the head  of training 
for the ANA, Germany trains the third (AFG) Armor Battalion160 stationed in Kabul. 
Romania will take over this task during the first half of 2008. However, these additional 
military elements have been deployed and currently play an important role in ISAF’s 
efforts to provide security.161 Obviously, they have also been deployed to fill a 
capabilities gap, which cannot be closed by the PRTs, and to promote the SSR process, 
which makes only slow or no progress. This is clear evidence of an insufficient and 
ineffective political process that can provide nothing but limited success in rebuilding 
Afghanistan. Thus, the political process either has to be developed further or reinitiated. 
Nevertheless, the presence of the PRTs throughout the country forced former warlords 
and regional power holders not to upsurge and struggle for power again, especially due to 
the reachback capabilities of conducting offensive air operations.162 
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Finally, the third objective of the PRTs is reconstruction. A PRT focuses on small 
scale projects such as building schools, clinics, village infrastructure or wells.163 By 
doing these projects, the PRT leadership intends to show goodwill but also wants to 
establish favorable situations and a good relationship with the Afghans to increase the 
acceptance of the presence of the PRT as a major contributing factor to force protection. 
PRTs often suffer from short term deployments (six months or less) especially of key 
personnel such as the commander. Consequently, the commanders are interested in 
projects that can be finished during their respective tours of duty and are often under 
pressure to show progress. Thus, hasty constructions of doubtful projects are carried out 
in an uncoordinated manner.164 Moreover, in an environment where confidence between 
military personnel and local populations prevail, intelligence information can be gathered 
more easily and properly.  
3. Structure and Capabilities 
Figure 5.   PRT Core Task Organization165 
 
Figure 5 depicts the general structure of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan. Due to the 
above-mentioned flexibility in interpreting the basic tasks of the PRT and the 
requirements of the respective environment, to be effective not all U.S. PRTs have a full 
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complement, especially on the civil side and within the enabler branch.166 The 
commander, as part of the Department of Defense, is directly supported by at least one 
representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of 
State and U.S. Department of Agriculture. The commander is usually the rank of 
lieutenant colonel and forms a command group with the representatives of the other 
agencies. Additionally, the Afghan Ministry of Interior seconds a senior officer to 
establish a liaison between the PRT and the Afghan government for coordination 
purposes. The commander is either named PRT commander in U.S. terms, or military 
commander in ISAF terms, which describes the most important difference.167 According 
to the U.S. understanding the “military has authority over the individual civilians 
regarding security matters, but not over the other agencies’ programs or activities.”168 
The Admin/Ops section is worth mentioning because it represents the staff of the 
PRT. The S2 branch consists only of an officer and an NCO, which means they are not 
able to analyze intelligence information; however, all activities in Afghanistan are 
intelligence driven. Information gathering and reporting along the chain of command is 
merely possible. PRTs rely on sophisticated intelligence information regarding local key 
personnel in their respective provinces. Therefore, access to this information is essential. 
Additionally, the S3 branch is also short on personnel. Concurrent military operations and 
planning of further operations will lead this section to the limit of what it can provide. 
According to the personnel in the Admin/Ops section, the staff is not able to conduct 
military activities 24/7 by relying on a day and night shift system. 
The combat service support (CSS) and the force protection (FP)/security section 
provide not only real life support,169 but also protected transportation, self-defense and 
force protection for civilians or other units that have to be active outside the PRT 
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compound. The limitations of both sections are also a 24/7 duty, and according to the 
personnel strength and the equipment of the FP/security section, it is reasonable to 
assume that active patrolling, establishment of temporary checkpoints, quelling riots, 
controlling, disarmaments, or even measures higher on the intensity scale are not possible 
to conduct. Therefore, the reachback possibility on quick reaction forces, and perhaps 
also on air assets, is vital for the U.S.-led PRTs. These kinds of U.S. PRTs are also called 
“light” PRTs.170 
The enabler section consists of civil affair teams and military police teams. 
Besides the command group, the enabler section is the most important with regards to the 
purpose of PRTs and their contribution to stability. Stability, as it is understood by the 
U.S., is not primarily established by military means, but rather by diplomatic, economic 
and reconstruction efforts. Thus, the U.S. PRTs are more suited to become effective in 
areas where conflicts and hot spots do not prevail and where other means to enhance 
stability are necessary. 
To sum up, although the U.S.-led PRTs originated under the OEF mission, they 
widely mirror the requirements of the mission given to them by COM ISAF., A slight 
shortfall in military capabilities has to be mentioned, though Figure 2 “demonstrates the 
military centric nature of the PRTs in Afghanistan.”171 Thus, the operational work in the 
field is done by a minority and in the case of the U.S. PRT in Jalabad, “was comprised of 
seven people who conducted the substantive work.”172 
4. Environment  
Ten out of twelve U.S.-led PRTs are located in the eastern provinces of 
Afghanistan and are thus, under the command of RCE.  
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Figure 6.   Area of Responsibility RCE173 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the designated provinces (yellow highlighted) in the eastern part 
of Afghanistan where RCE is in charge and where U.S.-led PRTs are established. 
Exceptions are Vardak province where a Turkish PRT is run and the New Zealand PRT 
in Bamian province. Additionally, Kabul province has to be excluded because RCC is in 
charge there. Bagram airbase embraces different functions. Besides the use of the airfield, 
it serves ISAF as a forward support base (FSB) of RCE as well as the U.S. national HQ, 
tactical OEF HQ and RCE HQ. The HQs are collocated and pooled together. The 
establishment of a PRT in Bagram district, Parvan province is consistent with the 
necessity for stability as a force protection measure for that base. 
It is remarkable that the U.S. PRTs have been established predominantly in the 
eastern provinces of Afghanistan, which are along the Afghan-Pakistani border and 
adjacent to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Although    
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FATA is explained in Chapter V of this thesis, it comprises several sub-tribes of the 
Pashtun tribe and consists of seven agencies.174 FATA is primarily a tribal area that is not 
directly governed by the Pakistani government and which has retained its semi-
autonomous status as a legacy of the British colonization from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.175 The Hanafi school of law of the holy religion of Islam prevails 
homogeneously on both sides of the border. However, the border176 is of porous 
character and divides the tribes arbitrarily.177 The terrain on both sides is very rugged and 
mountainous and therefore, non-permissive for mechanized military operations. 
Additionally, the Taliban and other Islamic fundamentalist movements178 have found 
new homes in the designated borderland after their dispersal in late 2001 occurred with 
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, these groups use the borderland for training, 
recruiting, and planning attacks to destabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, 
the first Afghan provinces that are affected when elements of these groups want to 
penetrate Afghanistan are the ones in which the U.S. have established PRTs. The PRTs in 
Jalalabad, Asadabad, Gardes and Khowst are strategic locations in terms of controlling 
movements from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa. For instance, Jalalabad in 
Nangarhar province is not only economically important, the only trade route from 
Pakistan to Kabul goes through that province, and the economic center of the eastern 
provinces is established in Jalalabad. But Nangarhar province is also a huge contributor 
to heroin production, although the province is considered one of the most educated parts 
of Afghanistan. Nangarhar encompasses fertile lands, to a large extent, and is therefore 
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called the breadbasket of Afghanistan. Jalalabad welcomed Osama bin Laden in 1996 
after he had been forced to leave Sudan, and on the Pakistani side of the border, the next 
huge town is Peshawar, where bin Laden has also found refuge.179 
Furthermore, the area of operations for the U.S. PRTs is probably a legacy of the 
OEF mission, which has been to chase key personnel as well as remnants of the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda network in the mountainous region of Tora Bora. During the initial phase 
of OEF in 2002 and 2003, most of the PRTs were located in hot spots lacking the 
presence of any International Organization (IO) as well as Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO).180 Nevertheless, the region under U.S. responsibility is very 
volatile due to the following recent hot spots and headlines.  
On 08 February 2008, a suicide car bomb killed two and injured five in Ghazni 
province. In Khost province, a car bomb injured three NATO soldiers, roadside bombs 
killed four and another roadside bomb killed a child and five police in February 2008. 
Moreover, a roadside bomb killed seven in Konar province on 23 February 2008. In 
Paktika province, IEDs were dismantled in Bermel on 06 February 2008 and two Polish 
soldiers were killed on 26 February 2008. Finally, a hot spot occurred in Laghman 
province on 27 February 2008 where the Taliban ambushed an official’s convoy.181 
Figure 7 shows that the security assessment of the United Nations in the eastern 
provinces of Afghanistan is dominated by areas of high risk (orange/amber). There are 
also a few regions where only a medium risk prevails, however, extreme risk areas can 
also be found. And worse, there are three areas (circles in the borderland) in which 
accessibility deteriorated from 2006 to 2007. 
Thus, the AOR of RCE is volatile and insecure. This environment requires robust 
forces to counter those threats and to stabilize the region. The fact that the situation there 
actually deteriorated proves insufficient military means and the ineffectiveness of 
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diplomatic and reconstruction efforts of the PRTs. Regarding NATO’s spectrum of 
intervention as shown in Chapter II the overarching objective should be the elimination 
of insurgency. The military assets of the U.S. PRTs are unsuitable for those operations. A 
reach back on OEF capabilities is crucial and absolutely necessary to counter these 
threats effectively, however, it also indicates limited success. The U.S. PRTs are more 
suitable in environments where a stable situation prevails and where political and 
economic efforts could get a grip on the development process. 
Figure 7.   Security Accessibility Map182 
 
5. National Policies and Funding 
The Bush administration changed its policy toward Afghanistan in 2002. The shift 
was from a strictly military approach to a more assisting, development and helping 
character.183 “In April 2002, President Bush addressed the U.S. commitment to help the 
Afghan people recover from the Taliban rule. He referenced the success of George C. 
Marshall’s vision to rebuild Europe and Japan after World War II, referring to a 
“Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.” In the summer of 2002, the need to accelerate 
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reconstruction in Afghanistan led the U.S. government to seek a way to “spread the ISAF 
effect” through the deployment of small U.S.-led coalition elements.”184 
The broad U.S. national interests in Afghanistan are creating a stable government 
with capacity and legitimacy, preventing the development and spread of political 
extremist ideology and countering insurgent and terrorist elements.185 To ensure these 
interests, the U.S. pursues the approach of the international community regarding the 
NATO commitment and finally assigned its PRTs in October 2006 under ISAF 
command. However, the national chain of command is dominated by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) in comparison to the other involved departments. This is expressed in the 
enormous financial resources of FY 2007 when the DoD had 439.3 billion USD available 
in comparison to the budgets of the Department of State (DoS) with 9.5 billion USD and 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with 3.15 billion USD.186 
Consequently, the DoD dominates the decision making process in Washington as well as 
the decisions on the tactical level regarding Afghanistan. The DoD considers stability 
operations more fruitful than combat operations in the environment of Afghanistan and 
interprets the PRTs as a tool for winning hearts and minds by conducting small scale and 
short term reconstruction projects, also called quick impact projects (QIPs).187 
The U.S. funding for the PRTs in Afghanistan is made available from the DoD’s 
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is part of the DoD funding. 
This fund is totaled in FY 2007 with 1.5 billion USD.188 The Economic Support Fund 
(ESF), as part of non-military funding, amounted 510 million USD for Afghanistan, 
however, USAID assigned, in FY 2007, only 42 million USD to the PRTs in 
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Afghanistan.189 The total funding without supplemental money was 2.5 billion USD in 
FY 2007.190 In September 2007, the U.S. initiated a program called Local Governance 
and Community Development (LGCD) and replaced the QIPs for all projects that were 
funded by the ESF. The LGCD focuses on capacity building, encouraging civil society 
activities, and promotion of security and stability.191 
It is remarkable how enormous the sums that the DoD makes available for their 
PRTs in Afghanistan are. The PRT commander has the money “in his hands” and is 
immediately able to spend money for certain projects when he is in the field and talks to 
key personnel in his AOR. This effective and convincing means strengthens the authority 
of the commander through the lens of the local population due to the implied perceptions 
of a powerful man. This is a fundamental factor in establishing stability. 
C. GERMAN CASE STUDY 
1. German PRTs 
Germany has currently deployed two PRTs in Afghanistan. The first and larger 
one is located in Kunduz, Kunduz province, and it was established in November 2003. 
The other PRT is located in Feyzabad, Badakhshan province in the northeast of 
Afghanistan. The latter one was established in September 2004.192 Both PRTs also 
consist of other multinational military forces. Although Germany is the lead nation in 
both PRTs, and provides the bulk of the personnel, Belgium, France, Hungary and 
Romania participate in the PRT’s HQ in Kunduz, whereas the Czech Republic and 
Denmark have deployed forces in the HQ of the Feyzabad PRT and in the operational 
forces.193 Additionally, Germany is the lead nation in RCN and runs its own 
multinational HQ in Mazar-e Sharif separate from the national HQ, which is collocated 
but physically separate. An FSB is also run in Mazar-e Sharif to enable ISAF forces from 
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the AOR of RCN, but also from other locations, to sustain their commitment. Germany 
also provides other assets such as ISAF intra theatre airlift support (ITAS) with fixed and 
rotary wing air transport assets, a reconnaissance capability with its RECCE Tornados as 
well as extensive reconnaissance, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and 
logistical and medical support to ISAF. Moreover, Germany has deployed one OMLT 
assigned to 209 (ANA) INF Corps in Mazar-e Sharif and an OMLT that is located in 
Kunduz and supports the two (ANA) INF Kandak.194 Germany has planned to increase 
the deployment of the OMLTs to a total of seven until 2009, which would then represent 
15 percent of ISAF requested OMLTs in Afghanistan.195 Furthermore, Germany plans to 
establish an infantry training center in the northern region and a logistics school in Kabul 
to provide effective training possibilities for the ANA. Also worth mentioning is that 
Germany is going to take over the quick reaction force (QRF) of RCN in accordance with 
the withdrawal of the Norwegian forces who built this force before.196 These high value 
assets and the described engagement underscore the role as lead nation in the northern 
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Figure 8.   PRTs in the AOR of RCN197 
 
2. Mission  
The mission statement given by COM ISAF is the same for the German PRTs as 
it is for the U.S. PRTs. It is defined in the PRT’s Terms of Reference as Appendix 2 of 
ISAF’s PRT handbook.198 It is already mentioned in Chapters II-F and III-B-2of this 
thesis, however, it is important to reemphasize that it is comprised of a military and 
political dimension leading to three main objectives, which are governance, security and 
reconstruction.199 
Germany’s understanding is the same as the U.S.’s. First and foremost, the 
support of the central government in Kabul is the essential task and role of the PRTs. 
Consequently, the support of the pro-Kabul local power-holders is essential. In the 
beginning of the PRT in Kunduz in 2003 and 2004, it was very difficult to identify who 
was who. The presence of German forces in Kunduz province would have hardly been 
possible without supporting the local militia commander, Daoud, who had dubious 
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motives, although he showed compliance with the DDR process.200 Daoud, who had been 
the former governor of Kunduz province and also active in drug issues, was referred to as 
State Secretary in the Afghan Ministry of Interior by President Karzai in mid-2005.201 
This shows the obvious importance of the correct selection of the local key personnel 
based on available intelligence information. 
This overall goal is flanked by two lines of operations or guidelines; first, the civil 
tasks and secondly, the military tasks of the German PRTs. Civil tasks refer to the 
civilian exposure202 of German PRTs and  are conducted solely by civilians. The civilian 
effort is focused on promoting the political, economic and societal development and 
rebuilding, coordinating measures and giving recommendations regarding the 
development and training of the ANP, supporting the establishment of logistical, medical 
and economic infrastructure, and strengthening the societal structures, as well as 
supporting and coordinating the measures of multilateral associates, IOs, and NGOs. The 
military goals are primarily focused on the Afghan population. Although force protection 
is a huge issue for the German contingent, the overall military objective is to promote 
stability in cooperation with the Afghan security forces (ANA and ANP)  and to establish 
favorable conditions for all aid organizations to become effective. Consequently, German 
military forces pursue an active support of the SSR process by patrolling and by 
conducting checkpoints and information operations as well as by gathering information in 
the field. Additionally, the reconstruction measures of the German PRTs, which are 
understood to be QIPs, focusing on short-term impact, play only a minor role in the entire 
concept.  In accordance with the civilian leadership of the German PRTs and all other aid 
organizations, the military forces of the PRTs conduct limited small scale reconstruction 
projects to increase its acceptance among the local population. The German MoEC 
pursues a strict separation between military deployment and development and nation-
building measures. Therefore, military CIMIC teams have not been deployed in the 
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PRTs. Information operations are a vital asset for PRTs and thus, German PRTs produce 
and distribute a newspaper203 on a two-week basis and run a radio station with the same 
name.204  
The German approach depicts two things. First, long-term development measures 
conducted by civilian aid agencies are more important than short-term projects realized 
by the military. Secondly, the military forces play only a secondary or complementary 
role due to the fact that the Afghan security forces are primarily responsible for restoring 
and maintaining a secure and stable environment. Additionally, Germany intends to 
strengthen the Afghan society as a fundamental contributor to self-responsibility for their 
own nation. Thus, Germany emphasizes Afghan ownership. Regarding ISAF’s spectrum 
of intervention,205 the German PRTs operate somewhere between stability and 
transformational development. Hence, it is important to retain this situation with the 
ANA and ANP involved, neither of which has been developed as they should have. Even 
though the ANA evinces an initial operating capability and will be fully operational in 
2010,206 the question is to who are the respective commanders loyal and to what extent is 
the force corrupt? This can also applied to the ANP, which means that the German 
approach carries a huge risk and has to be sensitively assessed. 
3. Structure and Capabilities  
Figure 9 provides an overview of the structure of the German PRT in Kunduz. 
The leadership of the German PRTs is not solely a military nature; it is dominated by two 
chains of command, the civilian and the military. Neither side is subordinated to the 
other. Thus, the leadership of German PRTs is double-headed and consists of a military 
full colonel (0-6) and a civilian diplomat from the German Foreign Office (FO) who has 
a rank comparable to his military counterpart. Both are deeply intertwined and coordinate 
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their own activities; however, the military commander is not able to give orders to the 
civilian leader and vice versa. Both are separately responsible to conduct the tasks 
mentioned above. The civilian part of the PRT embraces representatives of the Ministry 
of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC) as well 
as additional representatives of the FO, and in combination with the military commander 
as the highest representative of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the inter-ministerial 
approach of the German Afghan policy becomes clear.207 Including representatives of the 
German Development Service (DED), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the 
German State Development Bank (KfW), the personnel strength of the civil exposure in 
Kunduz is more than twenty.208 To coordinate the political, economic, military and 
societal guidance from Germany, an inter-ministerial steering group meets on a weekly 
basis and develops and implements, under the leadership of the FO, Germany’s Afghan 
policy.209 
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The military part of the PRT in Kunduz includes 417211 German servicemen as of 
April 2007. Although the main work of the PRT is concentrated in the civil sector, the 
Kunduz PRT is the largest one in all of Afghanistan. The PRT commander is integrated 
in ISAFs and in the national chain of command. All German PRTs are considered 
completely self-sufficient for at least thirty days, and as long as there is no interruption in 
the follow-on supply. Moreover, the CSS capabilities are so sustainable that other nations 
can fall back and rely on that support.212 The HQ is organized in two shifts operating 
24/7, sustainable over an extended period of time and sufficiently equipped to take care 
of current operations and to plan further operations.213 The main enablers of the HQ 
support company are a small CIMIC unit and a Belgian cargo and air terminal operations 
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(CATO) unit as well as an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team. The military police 
(MP) are able to conduct not only force protection, escorting and patrolling measures, but 
are also able to train officers of the ANP. The mechanized infantry is comprised solely of 
infantry elements and a reconnaissance unit.214 Overall, the military organization can be 
considered a robust structure able to enforce measures when necessary and able to 
actively pursue the establishment of security. However, the military forces are not able to 
maintain favorable situations over an extended period of time in terms of the size, 
population density of the respective provinces, nor the insurgent tactics that prevail in 
Afghanistan. For instance, the military forces in Kunduz, which can execute operational 
tasks outside the camp and conduct work in the field, numbers approximately 200. In 
comparison to the population of Kunduz and Taloquan province, for which they are 
responsible, a force to local population ratio of nearly 1:5675 accrues. This is “the lowest 
per capita commitment of peacekeeping personnel to any post-conflict environment since 
the end of World War II.”215 Even in Bosnia and Kosovo216  the ratio of peacekeeper to 
citizens was 1:48 and 1:58.217 Consequently, the number of military peacekeepers or – 
enforcers is probably too high to be generated and deployed by the international 
community, considering the difficulties of NATO member states’ readiness to provide 
more troops. Therefore, a sole military solution is unlikely and other assets and activities 
such as political, economic and social measures have to be strengthened to establish and 
maintain stability and security. This is mandatory, because security is the prerequisite for 
everything else. 
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The PRT in Feyzabad, Badakhshan province consists of the same organization but 
has fewer personnel. As of April 2007, the personnel strength was 277 German 
servicemen and around 10 civilians.218 
The above mentioned structure and strict separation is presently the largest 
challenge as far as cooperation and coordination. This means that the PRT not only has to 
coordinate its activities with external players such as other IOs and NGOs, which are not 
directly linked to Germany, but also internally between the military and the civil side of 
the PRT. A continuous and confident cooperation between the military commander and 
the civil leader is a necessary prerequisite to perform successfully. Subsequently, the 
coordination of all activities within the international community has to be managed, 
which is even more complicated. This approach and structure is a mirror of the German 
constitution as a result of the post-war scenario. The founders of the republic established 
a mechanism to avoid that any section, department or group can get a violence monopoly 
over others. The German Armed Forces is compulsory-bound to the primacy of politics 
and, therefore, subdivided into a civil part and the forces. One of the control mechanisms 
is the military budget, which is not under the control of the military, but rather under 
civilian administration. This “constitutionally-enshrined principle of Ressortprinzip 
(department principle) grants federal ministries a high degree of autonomy in formulating 
and implementing policy.”219  
Another huge challenge is the matter of national caveats, which some authors220 
refer to as restrictions and deficiencies. Caveats in military decision processes are not 
unusual, but  are basically used as constraints/restraints. That national caveats make the 
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deployment and engagement of certain military forces more complex and inflexible is 
obvious. Military forces are an expression of a state’s sovereignty and contribute to a 
state’s capacity to conduct policies as well as being a vital part of a state’s capacity to 
defend itself. What state would give parts of such a crucial asset into the hands of a 
multinational commander without any control over its forces? It is reasonable to assume 
that no state would act in such an inappropriate manner. Thus, multinational HQ 
responsible for tasking those forces needs sufficient planning capacities to consider these 
national caveats as they are given.  
This means, in the case of Germany, that first and foremost the German 
parliament has to mandate the commitment that was made on 12 October 2007. This 
mandate expires after twelve months and limits the German commitment to the northern 
region and to Kabul. ISAF support can only be conducted out of these designated areas of 
operations (AOO) when it is time-limited, the support is appropriate, and the extent of 
this support is limited to certain capabilities and mandatory for the entire success of the 
ISAF mission.221 Consequently, no German servicemen can be tasked to AOOs outside 
the northern region or Kabul unless explicit permission is given. To the knowledge of the 
author, three more constraints prevail besides the above mentioned. First, force protection 
for each German soldier is compulsory whereas the national commander determines dress 
and vehicle codes independent of ISAF’s regulations, secondly, dangers to the local 
population have to be excluded as much as possible,222 and thirdly, German servicemen 
cannot participate actively in counter-narcotics operations.223 
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4. Environment  
Germany is the lead nation in the northern region of Afghanistan. According to 
the existing literature, this region is calmer and more stable and a development-friendly 
situation prevails. Figure 10 provides hard data on the AOR of RCN and compares it to 
the size of Kosovo. Other than a small strip in the north where nourishing soil prevails, 
the eastern parts are dominated by rugged and mountainous terrain. Elevation differences 
vary from 300 meters to 5700 meters in the Hindukush. Badakhshan is a high mountain 
region where parts are definitely no-go terrain. Huge parts of the AOR are not reachable 
or it simply takes too long to penetrate certain areas.224  
Figure 10.   Dimensions and Population of the Northern Region225 
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The region embraces other huge challenges. The northern region is the most 
fragmented region in Afghanistan. Not only Uzbeks and Tajiks prevail in the north but 
there are also several Pashtun pockets spread throughout the entire northern region in 
which the Taliban finds safe havens. Moreover, several prominent warlords have 
established themselves in the north. Some of them are Dostum and Parwhan, who are 
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active in Faryab and Jawzjan province, Atta in Balkh province, Mohaqqeq in Samangan 
province, who controls the northern entrance of the Salang tunnel, and finally Daoud and 
Nazir who operate in Kunduz,Takhar and Badakhshan province where poppy growing, 
processing, and drug trafficking prevails.226 The above mentioned warlords and other 
smaller warlords make the situation more complex and intertwined than anywhere else. 
Several opposing military forces (OMF), locally and regionally, conduct organized crime 
against the international community as well as against the central government in Kabul, 
in spite of the presence of dangerous drug barons, especially in Badakshan province, 
which is one of the largest poppy cultivation areas in Afghanistan.227 Within this 
complex environment, insurgent activities have been carried out periodically into the 
northern region.228 Additionally, the remnants of the Northern Alliance continuously try 
to expand their influence and therefore clash with other warlords.229 
This environment vitally needs information about who is who. Thus, strong 
intelligence cells are necessary. Additionally, mobile air forces are required to quickly 
counter the power struggles between the warlords and the partial insurgents in that region 
to avoid a deterioration of the situation. In the northern region this is more likely than in 
the other regions, due to several key personnel and to the complex environment. 
5. Policies and Funding  
Germany’s commitment is rooted politically in several factors. First, although the 
Bonn Conference was not chaired by Germany, it was held and hosted in Germany and 
Germany played an active role in initiating the process to rebuild Afghanistan. Failure in 
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this process is not allowed.230 Secondly, Germany realized that NATO increased its 
commitment in Afghanistan and that was the signal for Germany to tighten the alliance 
with NATO. Thirdly, the former chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, assured in 
May 2003, to the former U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, an increase in Germany’s 
commitment to Afghanistan outside the boundaries of Kabul. Kunduz was obviously 
more unpleasant than Baghdad.231 
Germany’s government developed an Afghanistan concept that was updated on 05 
September 2007 and related to the Afghanistan Compact,232  which was agreed upon in 
London on 31 January and 01 February 2006.233 This inter-ministerial consensus-based 
document of the German government defines the slogan “No security without rebuilding 
and development. […] No rebuilding and development without security”234 The German 
understanding is based on the importance of civil aid and strengthens the civil sector by 
reducing reconstruction conducted by military CIMIC teams to the lowest level to ensure 
as much force protection as necessary. Areas of concerns are the establishment of state 
institutions and the development of capability and autonomy for the government to 
execute its policies, adequate application of rule of law and human rights, refugees and 
settlement issues, and improvement of livelihood and job opportunities, as well as 
humanitarian mine clearing. These first and foremost considerations show Germany’s 
primary goal to promote good governance of the central government in Kabul and extend 
its influence in the rural areas. However, the security situation is also considered very 
carefully and the intention is to retain the civil-military approach of the PRTs, but also to 
expand their presence, especially in provinces where no PRT is operating. Therefore, 
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Germany intends to create and deploy Provincial Advisory Teams (PATs) in those areas. 
These PATs are small units encompassing approximately fifteen personnel and are used 
primarily to establish liaisons and communicate with local key personnel in the 
designated areas. In 2008, Germany will establish a PAT in Taloquan, Takhar province, 
where currently only an outpost of the PRT Kunduz is present. Other nations (Czech 
Republic and Sweden) also plan to initiate PATs in the northern region.235 Additionally, 
Germany emphasizes the assisting nature of the ISAF mission and takes on the ANA and 
ANP in their promise, as primary contributors, to stability and security in Afghanistan, 
although the combat readiness of the ANA is currently assessed at only 16,000. 
Considering the number of trained ANA personnel, at 37,000 as of 2007, it is unlikely 
that the target of 70,000 combat ready ANA personnel can be reached by 2010. This gap 
has to be filled with military forces deployed by the international community.236 
Regarding the process of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) and counter-
narcotics activities, Germany steps in in an observer role and will only provide 
recommendations to the Afghan government.237 The DIAG process is officially the 
subsequent process of the DDR238 process. Germany’s Afghanistan concept stresses the 
necessity of coordination with all the aid and military efforts of the international 
community to gain synergies and coherence between all actors. Therefore, Germany 
promotes the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which was initiated by 
the Afghanistan Compact due to the fact that the PRT Executive Steering Committee, the 
PRT Working Groups and the NGO Civil Military Working Group lacked authority and 
effectiveness. This coordination mechanism is co-chaired by the Afghan government and 
the UNAMA and currently consists of seven Afghan secretaries and 234 international 
members and it is to coordinate civil and military efforts to improve effectiveness and 
report its decisions to the public.239 
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German funding is not predetermined in a fixed budget. Due to the inter-
ministerial approach, financial resources are assigned to certain projects for development 
and stabilization purposes. The military PRT commander has a small amount of money 
under his direct control to conduct low-cost QIPs. Although the MoD has a larger budget 
as do the other participating ministries, MoEC spent 70 million USD in 2007 focusing on 
long-term development projects. Additionally, 10 million USD, as part of the 
development-oriented emergency aids, were dedicated in 2007 to local needs in a flexible 
and quick manner to demonstrate visible and rapid progress. The latter pot is under the 
control of the representatives of the MoEC in Afghanistan, where the decisions as to how 
and for what the other money is spent have usually been made in Germany within the 
inter-ministerial steering group. Moreover, a Provincial Development Fund has been 
assigned, with more than 3 million USD in 2007, to the Communities Development 
Councils, which consists of officials in the northern region from the Office of the 
Governor, the Provincial Council, the Department of Women’s Affairs, the Department 
of Rural Development and, of course, representatives from the German MoEC, FO, MoI 
and MoD. Afghans can get money from that pot by formulating an informal request that 
has to be approved by the committee.240 
The inter-ministerial approach mirrors the post-war constitution of Germany. 
However, this approach requires close cooperation and coordination of the participating 
ministries in Germany, which is challenging, due to the ministries’ high degree of 
autonomy. This approach is complex and the national decision-making regarding this 
issue is slow. Additionally, after consensus has been gained in the national inter-
ministerial steering group, the coordination work has to be managed in Afghanistan with 
all the other Afghans, IOs and NGOs on different levels. This structure makes the entire 
approach idle and leads to a loss of effectiveness. German funding, in relation to the 
northern region, where the situation is mostly calm and stable, appears to be too low 
because this environment is suitable for long-term development projects to conduct  
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effective rebuilding and contribute to sustainable stability and security. The situation in 
the north is at a decision point whether it improves to a self-sustaining situation or sets 
back into conflicts. 
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has scrutinized the U.S. and German-led PRTs. Although both are 
guided and tasked along ISAF’s chain of command, in the same manner and pursuing the 
same objectives, the national hallmark adjusts the PRTs in their daily execution of civil 
and military activities differently. Consequently, unity of command is not ensured, which 
gets even worse in the case of the U.S. PRTs, due to the responsibility of its national HQ 
for OEF. Despite all the national interests, which would never be given up by the 
participating nations, there is coherence within the multinational environment because the 
overarching objectives given by NATO are integrated and mirrored in both mission 
statements. The apparent point is that coordination and cooperation has to be conducted 
closely and friction losses have to be reduced. Additionally, the main findings in this 
chapter are as follows. 
• The subsequent interpretations of ISAF’s mission are different between 
the U.S. and German-led PRTs. The U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan are 
dominated and led primarily by the representatives of the DoD and focus 
more on reconstruction efforts assessed and motivated by the military, 
whereas many other “national programs in the provinces were poorly 
coordinated with the U.S.-led PRTs.”241 However, the U.S. pursues the 
approach of diplomacy, liaison and communication first. Germany 
emphasizes the importance of development and rebuilding efforts and 
assigns, therefore, the civil exposure of the PRTs a prominent role, 
whereas, the military is one of the enablers in this context and supports the 
SSR process actively. 
• The U.S. PRTs are light, whereas the German PRTs are robustly 
structured. The military forces do not have the ability to assert themselves 
against riots or medium to large scale firefights and the operational work 
in the field is conducted by the command group, which is basically 
comprised of civilian personnel. Germany’s operational footprint out of 
the PRTs’ compound is larger. The military force is able to actively 
conduct a show of force and to enforce certain things when required. The  
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unity of command within the U.S. PRTs is more effective than the German 
inter-ministerial structure, which requires consensus for projects in the 
steering group in Germany. 
• The U.S. PRTs operate in an environment that is more volatile than the 
northern region where Germany is engaged. The environment of RCE 
requires more sustainable forces, whereas the German military forces in 
the northern region are almost too robust. The deployment of the PRTs 
should be exactly the other way around. U.S. forces are more suitable for 
operateing in the north and Germany’s forces can face the threats in the 
east more properly. Reachback capabilities, such as tactical ground 
reserves (QRF) and air assets, are in both cases, ensured and absolutely 
essential. 
• Germany provides limited monetary resources for development and 
rebuilding related to the needs of the northern region. This region is 
basically calm and stable and suitable for several projects of this category 
to gain long-term effects.  
In this chapter the development of certain teams such as OMLTs, ETTs, PMPTs 
and PATs was described. The initiation and deployment of these teams is evidence that 
the overall political process needs stimulation and promotion, and perhaps some new 
aspects. Obviously, all the deployed PRTs are insufficiently equipped to fill those gaps. 
Consequently, PRTs in general are limited in their capabilities not only in the military 
sector to hold favorable security situations against insurgents, but also in other sectors, 
which would normally lead to stability and security and are, therefore, the responsibility 
of PRTs. Thus, PRTs are only an asset for a time-limited period in which the 
environment and other influencing factors enable effective PRT work. This period is in 
NATO’s spectrum of intervention in chapter II-F., the yellow stability section. Left or 
right of this, other assets have to be deployed or the structure and capabilities of the PRTs 
have to be adjusted. This conclusion is related to the internal structure of PRTs.  
The next chapter proves the claim that the capabilities of PRTs are limited, in a 
post-conflict scenario, by assessing the effectiveness of PRTs. Based on reports from 
2006 and earlier, trends regarding the security situation, relationship-building and 
capacity-building will be given from an external point of view, which means that the 




the contributing nations are basically of a positive nature, although there is no doubt 
about the initial success of PRTs regarding the extension of the influence of the central 
government in Kabul. 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGNATED PRTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter emphasizes external views on PRTs to assess their impact and 
perception in the field, and in the central government in Kabul, as well as among the local 
population. Official military, NATO, and UN assessments usually speak of the  initial 
successes of the PRT approach regarding the extension of the influence of the central 
government, the establishment of a certain level of security, and promoting the economic 
and developmental situation in the respective areas, although they also deal out critique 
regarding a missing common strategy, a lack of troop personnel and shortages on 
resources, especially funding, as way too small  an overall commitment by the 
international community. Military institutions term PRTs as an “effective, flexible, low-
cost instrument that can easily be adapted to other conflicts.”242 “They [PRTs] have 
played important roles in everything from election support to school-building to 
disarmament to mediating factional conflicts.”243 The question in this chapter is how 
external actors perceive the activities of PRTs. 
“Western forces’ success in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and in achieving a 
satisfactory level of security throughout Afghanistan remains limited.”244 Moreover, 
external perceptions such as an insufficient cohesion of the multinational military forces 
or an elusive concept behind the civil-military approach in which coordination and 
cooperation are identified as crucial, but not yet resolved, prevail.245 Furthermore, the 
PRT activities of the military contribution to security have been recognized as too low 
due to the fact that local key personnel have not been sufficiently involved and thus, they 
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have not met the local security needs properly.246 Regarding the aid efforts, the local 
perceptions in Afghanistan are three-fold: disillusionment, disempowerment and 
disengagement. Additionally, a disconnection between the present aid agencies and the 
local population prevails, which begins with different understandings of peace and 
security and continues with the nature of humanitarian agencies and the aid 
community.247 In general, the “great expectations have not been met.”248 In particular, 
the largest disappointments are concentrated in mismatched aids, in a non-trustworthy 
government, in a stagnation of the socio-economic situation, in a deterioration of the 
security situation and in a mismanagement of the international aid efforts.249 Antonio 
Donini calls this phenomenon a perception gap between externals and local communities. 
Consequently, the analyses and assessments of officials do not mirror the reality and  
often lead to an initiation or even a continuation of inconvenient approaches. On the other 
hand, the legitimacy of the international community decreases continuously and the local 
warlords gain power because they meet the local needs exactly. Thus, it is of utmost 
importance to analyze and then meet the local demands for the establishment of a 
sustainable security situation.  
This chapter links the PRT activities to the perceptions of the local population and 
other aid agencies in a causal relationship. This means that the impact of these activities 
is measured from an external point of view rather than counting the number of built 
schools, hospitals, etc. By doing so, the effectiveness of PRTs can be deduced and will 
provide trends in certain categories. In military environments a commander assesses the 
performance of his subordinate units along the original tasks, committed resources and 
the time period. Thus, the performance and effectiveness of PRT activities are also 
assessed along their original tasks, which are mentioned above; however, they are of a 
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qualitative nature and represent trends. “Determining impact is always complex.”250 The 
arguments and conclusions of this chapter are complementary to the ones posted in 
Chapter III. 
B. DEFINITION OF THE CRITERIA 
There are currently no metrics defined to assess the performance of PRTs. 
Reporting and assessing the activities and work of PRTs is usually based on a 
quantitative measure such as kilometers of newly built roads, number of trainings 
conducted, amount of tons transported, amount of money spent, number of wells dug, etc. 
As mentioned above, these reports and assessments usually describe positive effects on 
the respective environment. Consequently, assessments based on comprehensive 
outcomes or cost-benefit analysis are lacking. These assessments are difficult due to the 
volatile environments the PRTs are operating in and to different structures and thus 
different capabilities.251 Therefore, this assessment emphasizes only the impact of PRT 
activities and the perception of these activities among external factors that are linked 
together. Due to this challenging approach, trends are derived from the impacts and the 
perceptions in certain categories, which are aligned to the tasks of PRTs mentioned in 
Chapters II-F and III of this thesis. The assessment focuses only on the U.S.and German-
led PRTs and thus only on their respective environments and the IOs and NGOs that 
operate in those regions. 
The PRT handbook does not offer metrics or measurements of the effectiveness or 
performance of the PRTs. They are targeted to the specific needs of the local 
environment and toward increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the local officials 
and institutions.252 The Afghanistan Compact provides, in its Annex 1, benchmarks and 
timelines.253 It differentiates between security, governance, rule of law and human rights, 
as well as economic and social development. In the category of security, the following 
                                                 
250 Abbaszadeh and others, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, 14. 
251 Ibid. 
252 International Security Assistance Force, PRT Handbook, 9-13. 
253 Afghan Government and International Community, The Afghanistan Compact, 7-13. 
 76
benchmarks are defined. By the end of 2010, ISAF, OEF and all the PRTs in Afghanistan 
should promote security and stability throughout the country including the support of 
Afghan security forces. The ANA should be fully operational by the end of 2010 with a 
personnel strength of 70,000 capable of meeting the security needs of the country as well 
as the ANP and the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) comprised of 62,000 
personnel. The DIAG process was already completed at the end of last year. The counter-
narcotics efforts should be strengthened by the Afghan government and the governments 
of adjacent countries by enforcing laws and mutual counter-activities. Finally, the areas 
contaminated by land mines and ammunition dumps should be reduced by 70 percent by 
the end of 2010.254 These benchmarks are very challenging regarding the time period and 
represent a vision of the Afghan government and the international community. 
Concurrently, these benchmarks are not suitable for assessing the current performance of 
the PRT activities. 
Due to the fact that no officially defined metrics exist, previous attempts to assess 
the performance of PRTs regarding the impact of their activities are followed. By doing 
so, redundancies are avoided and perhaps useful metrics can be established or further 
developed. Thus, this thesis follows Peter Viggo Jakobsen,255 Michael J. McNerney256 
and the Save the Children article by Gerard Mc Hugh.257 The criteria are derived from 
the three core principles developed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee. These are: 
to strengthen and extend the authority of the central government in Kabul throughout the 
country, assist in establishing stability and security, and enable reconstruction including 
the coordination between civilian and military actors.258 Thus, the four performance 
criteria defined in this thesis are capacity building, stability, relationship-building, and aid 
                                                 
254 Afghan Government and International Community, The Afghanistan Compact, 7-13. For more 
details regarding the other categories see Ibid. 
255 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient, 1-54. 
256 McNerney, Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle,? 32. 
257 McHugh and Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in 
Afghanistan, 1-64. 
258 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient, 30. 
 77
projects and coordination.259 Within these initially defined categories, changes can 
appear. Situations can improve, deteriorate or stagnate260 based on the impacts of the 
PRT activities and the perception among external actors. Moreover, indicators are named 
and related to the respective criteria to assess whether a situation has changed. Table 2 
provides an overview of the metrics used for this thesis.  
Table 3.   Metrics to assess the performance of PRTs 
Category Performance Criteria  Indicators 
Authority of the central 
government in Kabul 
Capacity-building • support central 
government in Kabul 
• support of local 
government councils 
which are in line with 
Kabul 
• level of corruption 
• promote good 
governance 




• train and equip the 
ANA, ANP and ANBP 
• encounter warlords, 
local power holders and 
corrupt officials 






• number of incidents 
regarding minor 
interferences, banditry, 
crime, riots, unrests, 
illegal actions 
• number of firefights, 
                                                 
259 In this thesis capacity-building means the improvement of state capabilities such as administration, 
institutions, ANP, ANBP and ANA. Stability implies the perception of the security situation in the 
respective areas of the PRTs among officials, NGOs and the Afghan population. Relationship-building 
implies the establishment of relationships between military personnel and local key-decision makers and 
their subsequent impacts. Aid projects and coordination means the capability of the PRTs to establish 
conditions in which projects can be executed, to conduct small scale projects, to provide expertise for 
certain projects as well as to exchange and share information of planned and current actions between 
military personnel of the designated PRTs and the respective civilian aid actors. 










mortar attacks and other 
high intensity incidents, 
number of IEDs 
• number of suicide 
bombings 
• number of abductions 
• amount of risky areas 
• amount of poppy 
cultivation and drug 
production 
• amount of show of 
force military 
operations 
• military interventions 
• engagement of QRFs 
• commitment of 
offensive air operations 
Stability and security Relationship-building • liaison to local key 
decision personnel such 
as governors, police 
chiefs, official military 
commanders, economy 
people, maliks, 
scholars, warlords, local 
power holders, religious 
scholars, mullahs, 
moderate Taliban 




Aid projects and 
coordination 
• CIMIC activities of the 
PRTs regarding 
reconstruction 
• establishment of 
favorable conditions for 
the civil aid community 
to conduct their projects 
• levels of coordination 
• accessibility of specific 
areas 
• stimulate economic 
situation 
• promote social 
coherences and roots 
• amount of funding 
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• extent of local 
involvement 
• extent of meeting the 
local needs 
• number of 
reconstruction and 
development projects 
• promotion of the 
educational situation 
• establishment of 
employment 
opportunities 
• situation on human 
rights 
• women’s equality 
C. TREND MATRIX AND ASSESSMENT  
The trend matrix and the following assessment draw conclusions from altering 
situations regarding the indicators and are related to the performance criteria mentioned 
in Table 2. This assessment differentiates between reports from IOs and NGOs due to 
their unique perceptions and considers only reports from 2006 and younger. In the case of 
reports that do not provide statements assignable to specific performance criteria, an 
“N/N” is put in the matrix. 
1. Reports of IOs 
Table 4.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the UN.261 
Performance Criteria United Nations Remarks 
Capacity-building 0 Deteriorations within 
the central government 
and improvements on 
the local governance 
level. 
                                                 
261 United Nations, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and 
Security (New York: United Nations, [2008]), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm (accessed March 3, 
2008). 
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Stability - North and west security 
issues related to 
factionalism and 
criminality. Insurgency 
in the south and east.  
Relationship-building + Government 
strengthened 
relationship to local 
communities. 
Aid projects and coordination 0 Accessibility is limited 
due to land mines. 
JCMB effective tool 
and non-opium 
economy is growing. 
Table 5.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the UN Security Council.262 
Performance Criteria UN Security Council Remarks 
Capacity-building - Failure of the central 
government and the 
international 
community to provide 
basic needs and good 
governance. Corruption 
prevails especially 
within the Ministry of 
Interior. 
Stability - Upsurge of security 
related incidents in 
Afghanistan. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination - NGOs and Afghans 
acting in dangerous 
situations. Situations 
regarding human rights 
and education 
deteriorated. 
                                                 
262 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 
November 2006 (New York: United Nations, [2006]). 
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Table 6.   Trend Matrix of the Report from NATO.263 
Performance Criteria NATO Remarks 
Capacity-building + NATO helped to 
improve governance at 
the national and the 
local level. Moreover, 
NATO provides 
opportunities for 
economic and political 
progress. 
Stability + A predominantly stable 
situation has occurred 
in most parts of the 
country although the 
security situation 
remains challenging in 
the south and in the 
east. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination + Number of health 
clinics and more 
children in schools 
appeared. 
Table 7.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the UNDSS.264 
Performance Criteria UNDSS Remarks 
Capacity-building + ANA has improved. 
Stability - Average security 
incidents in 2006, 425 
and in 2007, 525. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination - Accessibility 
deteriorated basically 
in the east, south and 
west. 
                                                 
263 NATO, Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008 (Brussels/Belgium: NATO, 
[2008]). 
264 United Nations, Department of Safety and Security in Afghanistan, Half-Year Review of the 
Security Situation in Afghanistan, 1-11. 
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Table 8.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.265 
Performance Criteria UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime 
Remarks 
Capacity-building - Especially in provinces 
where poppy 
cultivation is a large 
field, anti-government 
elements have been 
active and collect taxes.
Stability 0 Prognosis is that poppy 
cultivation will 
decrease slightly. 
Provinces in RCN and 
RCE are either 
completely poppy free 
or cultivation decreased 
compared to 2007. 
Only in Samangan in 
AOR of RCN poppy 
cultivation increased. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination N/N  
Table 9.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the UNAMA.266 
Performance Criteria UNAMA Remarks 
Capacity-building - Corruption has to be 
decreased and the 
needs of the population 
have to be met by the 
central government. 
Stability - Suicide bombing 
tactics appeared in 
Afghanistan in 2005 
and increase each year. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination - Socio-economic effects 
of suicide bombings 
                                                 
265 Afghan Government and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Opium Winter 
Rapid Assessment Survey (Kabul: United Nations, [2008]). 
266 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (Kabul: United 
Nations, [2007]). 
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have to be considered. 
Due to unpredictability, 
even in stable 
provinces the socio-
economic situation can 
deteriorate 
immediately. 
Table 10.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the USAID.267 
Performance Criteria USAID Remarks 
Capacity-building + There are initial 
successes in many 
locations where 
conditions have been 
established, which 
allow political, 
economic and social 
development. 
Stability + PRTs are an effective 
tool for improving 
stability. 
Relationship-building + PRTs strengthened 
local institutions and 
encouraged local 
leaders who support the 
central government in 
Kabul. 
Aid projects and coordination - Civil-military 
coordination between 
all agencies within 
U.S.-led PRTs has to 
be improved regarding 




access to funding and 
capabilities. 
                                                 
267 Morris and others, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, 
1-32. 
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2. Reports of NGOs 
Table 11.   Trend Matrix of the Report from Anthony H. Cordesman.268 
Performance Criteria Cordesman Remarks 
Capacity-building 0 Government carries out 
its responsibilities well; 
however, corruption is 
a huge issue. Trust in 
ANA and ANP prevails 
but both still need 
foreign support. 
Stability - Insecure situation 
prevails. Poppy 
cultivation increases 
and contributes to 
instability. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination + Development perceived 




Anthony H. Cordesman released several reports269 on Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
however, the content is redundant and repeats regularly. Therefore, no additional trends 
or assessments can be drawn from these reports. 
                                                 
268 Anthony H. Cordesman, Armed Nation Building: The Real Challenge in Afghanistan 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, [2007]), www.csis.org/burke (accessed 
December 12, 2007). 
269 Cordesman, The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War, 1-28; Cordesman, The 
Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report, 1-131; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Afghan-Pakistan War: Threat 
Developments (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, [2007]), 
www.csis.org/burke/reports (accessed December 12, 2007). 
 85
Table 12.   Trend Matrix of the Report from Amnesty International.270 
Performance Criteria Amnesty International Remarks 
Capacity-building - Judiciary sector 
underdeveloped 
regarding detention 
facilities and treatment 
of detainees. 
Stability N/N  
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination - Memorandum of 
Understanding has 




regulations after the 
transfer of detainees 
are missing. 
Table 13.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the ICRC. 271 
Performance Criteria ICRC Remarks 
Capacity-building - Kabul discontented 
with ISAF and not able 
to face security 
challenges. 
Stability - Security incidents have 
increased and are 
complex. Conflict has 
broadened and taken on 
new character. 
Relationship-building - ISAF has not 
effectively established 
liaison to religious 
personnel. ICRC did 
instead. 
                                                 
270 Amnesty International, Afghanistan, Detainees Transferred to Torture: ISAF Complicity?Amnesty 
International, [2007]). 
271 International Committee of the Red Cross, Afghanistan Annual Report ICRC, [2006]). 
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Performance Criteria ICRC Remarks 
Aid projects and coordination - Absence of social and 
economic change, 
which fuels tribal 
factions. 
Table 14.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the CMSS.272 
Performance Criteria CMSS Remarks 
Capacity-building - Central government 
corrupt and filled with 
former warlords on 
certain position. 
Taliban at least less 
corrupt! Lack of 
legitimacy of the 
government. 
Stability - Continuing insecurity 
as a result of tribal 
factions, organized 
crime, banditry, corrupt 
elements within the 
government and 
insurgents. 
Relationship-building + PRTs are really 
advisory teams within 
the local environment 
to officials. 
Aid projects and coordination - NGOs retreated 
basically from the 
south due to conditions 
in which aid cannot get 
grip. 
                                                 
272 Lara Olson and Hrach Gregorian, Side by Side Or Together? Working for Security, Development 
and Peace in Afghanistan and Liberia (Calgary/CA: Center for Military and Strategic Studies, [2007]). 
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Table 15.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the SFB 700 Governance.273 
Performance Criteria SFB 700 Governance Remarks 
Capacity-building - Development projects 
did not lead to more 
governance 
capabilities. 
Stability + Rural population 
perceived over the last 
two years that the 
security situation has 
improved. 
Relationship-building - Half of the rural 
population thought that 
the presence of foreign 
troops was a threat and 
foreign development 
projects pose a threat to 
the Islamic way of life. 
Aid projects and coordination + NGOs have been 
credited by the 
Afghans due to 
improvements in 
potable water, 
education and road 
infrastructure. 
Table 16.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the Atlantic Council.274 
Performance Criteria The Atlantic Council Remarks 
Capacity-building 0 Legal and judicial 
reforms as well as the 
control of narcotics are 




                                                 
273 Jan Koehler and Christoph Zuercher, Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in 
Afghanistan: Results from a Representative Survey (Berlin/Germany: DFG Research Center Freie 
Universität Berlin, [2007]). 
274 The Atlantic Council of the United States, Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent 
Action (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council Of The United States, [2008]), 
http://www.acus.org/docs/012808-AfghanistanbriefwoSAG.pdf (accessed February, 2 2008). 
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Stability - Without a remarkable 
improvement on the 
security sector, a 
coherent way forward 
cannot be conducted. 
Relationship-building - Relations to Pakistan 
have to be improved 
and the issue of the 
Afghan /Pakistan 
border has to be solved.
Aid projects and coordination - Little amount of 
coordination between 
NGOs and military 
forces. Only 10% of 
international funding 
goes directly to the 
Afghans. 
Table 17.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the Afghan Study Group.275 
Performance Criteria Afghan Study Group Remarks 
Capacity-building 0 Coherent and resourced 
strategy to strengthen 
the central government’s 
reach, capacity and 
legitimacy are missing. 
Stability 0 Quantity and quality of 
deployed forces have to 
be increased and focus 
all resources on the 
training of Afghan 
security forces is the 
most suitable way to 
produce more stability. 
Security of the border  
to Pakistan is vital and 
has to be improved. 
Relationship-building 0 Relations to moderate 
Taliban are lacking. 
Diplomatic relations to 
Pakistan and Iran are 
underdeveloped. 
                                                 
275 Afghanistan Study Group, Afghanistan Study Group Report, 1-48. 
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Performance Criteria Afghan Study Group Remarks 
Aid projects and coordination - Military command 
structure between OEF 
and NATO is 
inappropriate. A high-
level international 
coordinator under a 
mandate of the UN is 
mandatory to coordinate 
all aid efforts. There is 
an acute need for more 
international 
coordination. 
Table 18.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the Asian Development Bank.276 
Performance Criteria Asian Development Bank Remarks 
Capacity-building + Weak institutions and 
institutionalized 
corruption prevails. 
Stability + Insecurity is one of the 
operational challenges. 
Relationship-building N/N  
Aid projects and coordination - Afghanistan is still one 
of the least-developed 
countries in the world 
regarding health care, 
poverty, education and 
gender inequality. 
                                                 
276 Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan 2007: A Fact Sheet (Kabul/Afghanistan: Asian 
Development Bank, [2006]), www.adb.org (accessed April 6, 2008). 
 90
Table 19.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the Asia Foundation.277 
Performance Criteria The Asia Foundation Remarks 
Capacity-building + 80% of the Afghan 
people thought that the 
central government in 
Kabul did not care 
about the needs of the 
rural people. 
Corruption is a huge 
concern. 
Stability 0 Insecurity is the largest 
concern of the Afghan 
people on a national 
level. On the local level 
nearly 80% of the 
people did not feel 
threatened. Certain 
extent of trust in the 
ANP and ANA 
prevails. 
Relationship-building - Liaison to religious 
leaders should be 
strengthened. 
Aid projects and coordination + 50% of the people 
perceived that they 
were more prosperous 
than under the Taliban 
regime. 
                                                 
277 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the Afghan People: Key FindingsThe Asia 
Foundation, [2007]), http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=9 (accessed March 3, 2008). 
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Table 20.   Trend Matrix of the Report from the Swiss Peace Organization.278 
Performance Criteria Swiss Peace Remarks 
Capacity-building - Little democratic 
experience at national 
level and fragile or 
even non-existent state 
institutions prevail. 
Weak government 
especially in the 
provinces and 
uncompleted 
components of the 
Bonn Agreement are 
current major issues. 
Stability - Warlords maintained 
their militias and 
private armies. 
Relationship-building + Government attempted 
to negotiate with 
moderate Taliban. 
Aid projects and coordination + Weak donor 
coordination and 
diverging interests of 
international actors. 
3. Assessment 
The above depicted trend matrixes are an attempt to derive changes regarding 
performance criteria to which indicators are assigned. Moreover, the matrixes are 
subdivided between reports of IOs and NGOs due to the fact that IOs perceive their 
commitments more positively, although there are also realistic descriptions. On the other 
hand, the evaluation of situations conducted by NGOs is usually pure and unpicturesque, 
although one has to analyze who is funding the respective NGO. These reports, which are 
comprised of descriptions of blurring situations mixed up with the perception and 
interpretations of the author, lead to a subjective element in the trend matrixes. Thus, the 
                                                 
278 Swiss Peace, FAST Analytical Framework Afghanistan in December 2007 Swiss Peace, [2007]), 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/countries/index.html#c968 
(accessed April 06 2008). 
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assessment and the conclusions from these reports are limited, abstract, and of only a 
general character. Specific situations in certain PRTs might not be reflected in the trend 
matrixes. Moreover, all the reports represent an evaluation of the entire situation in 
Afghanistan except the USAID and the SFB 700 Governance reports. The latter one 
focuses more on the northeastern provinces of Kunduz and Takhar where the USAID 
report is related to all U.S.-led PRTs. Consequently, the conclusion cannot only be 
applied to the U.S. and German PRTs currently deployed in Afghanistan, but also to all 
others. Nevertheless, the question is to what extent the PRTs contribute to improvements 
in the performance criteria because these criteria are derived from the PRT tasks, as well 
as responsibilities, and should be directly influenced by their activities. 
Regarding capacity-building, there is no doubt about the successful extension of 
the influence of the central government in Kabul with the presence of PRTs in the 
provinces of Afghanistan. The reports of the IOs see improvements on the local 
governance level in most of the provinces, but not in all. The PRTs contributed to the 
promotion of political development due to the local establishment of conditions that 
allowed the conduction of local policies. On the other hand, governance on the national 
level is seen as critical. The central government was not able to carry out policies that 
met the needs of the Afghan people. Moreover, corruption prevails not only in the 
government, although several positions have been changed over the years, but neither the 
ANA nor the ANP have been functioning as they should. The initial successes were not 
assigned to the policies of the central government, but rather to the presence of the 
international community. Without that presence, the Afghan people assumed that the 
government would collapse. The NGOs’ reports underline this assessment by 
highlighting certain issues. The central government lacks a grand strategy for its country; 
the legal and judicial reforms are behind the expectations, the counter-narcotics efforts 
are prioritized too low and the government in Kabul lacks legitimacy, which can 
obviously not be strengthened by conducting development projects. 
The message regarding the security situation is nearly the same in all reports..  
The security situation has worsened for two years although stability is of utmost 
importance and a prerequisite for the effective rebuilding of Afghanistan. Of course, for 
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the long-term perspective, there are also other non-military factors that contribute to 
stability; however, in areas where high intensity hot spots occur, a robust enforcement of 
stability is essential. The overall number of security incidents has increased and the 
threats have become more complex due to the application of highly sophisticated 
insurgent techniques. The security situation in the northern and western provinces is 
dominated by factionalism and organized crime, whereas the eastern and southern 
provinces suffer from insurgents. This insurgency is dominated by anti-government 
elements and it is obvious, that the Taliban is not capable of fighting the international 
forces head-to-head, but on the other side, ISAF is also not able to hold victories over 
anti-government forces in any regard. The deployment of more and more troops to 
Afghanistan will definitely not solve this issue because it is not solely a military 
character. Due to the difficulties of generating forces within NATO, and with regard to 
the additional contributions of some NATO member states, it is unrealistic to request 
more and more troops to Afghanistan. Of course, there might be a number of personnel 
that will lead to a culmination of the security situation, but this number can never be 
generated. Moreover, the larger the international presence in Afghanistan, the more the 
character of the mission will change from assistance to occupation. This would 
consequently lead to a stronger resistance among the Afghans and might lead to the same 
experiences the British and the Russians gained in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The promotion of security by an indirect approach such as training and equipping the 
ANA and ANP, stimulation of economic markets, as well as development and aid 
projects are probably more effective. Figure 11 provides an overview of the additional 
contributions announced for 2008. 
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Figure 11.   Additional Contributions of Participating Nations for 2008279 
 
NATO estimates that the number of security incidents has increased but that 70 
percent of all the incidents have been conducted in only 10 percent of the districts in 
Afghanistan. These districts are well known and correspond with extremist areas. Figures 
12 and 13 show the distribution of security incidents across Afghanistan and the most 
affected districts in 2007. 
Figure 12.   Security Incidents across Afghanistan – 2007280 
 
                                                 
279 NATO, Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008, 11. 
280 Ibid. 
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Figure 13.   Security Incidents – Twenty most affected Districts 2007281 
 
Figures 12 and 13 lead to a purely tactical conclusion. If there are only a few 
districts where security related incidents occur, make these districts more secure 
militarily and stabilize the others by non-military means. The availability of a robust and 
highly mobile force capable of fighting high intensity spots in combination with air 
assault capabilities seems to be the best suitable answer to those threats. This means that 
such a force should be assigned to the respective RCs as an in-theatre tactical reserve, 
deployable with stand-by air assets, to the respective hot spots. 
The relationship-building efforts have not made progress as necessary. The liaison 
to officials within the provincial governments has been established and the perception is a 
well working cooperation. However, since that contact has not been sufficiently 
established with other key personnel in the local environment such as religious scholars 
or economic persons, the result is a slight distrust of the presence of the international 
force and the perception of a threat to the Islamic way of life. This means that the 
stagnation in establishing contact and conducting talks with important key personnel in  
 
                                                 
281 NATO, Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008, 11. 
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the local environment has to be overcome. With the provision of sophisticated 
intelligence information, those personnel talks have to be conducted to increase the 
legitimacy and acceptance of the presence of the international force. 
The development and aid situation is also sobering. Although the number of 
different projects has risen and the amount of the international funding is tremendously 
high, the aid environment is dominated by inaccessible regions to which aid cannot be 
given. This inaccessibility is largely caused by the amount of landmines throughout the 
country as well as the insecure situation. Only the consideration of possible insurgents 
could result in a backlash of already stabilized areas where development projects are 
planned, initiated and conducted. The unpredictability of insurgents might lead to a 
withdrawal of aid workers. 
Finally, the overall assessment of the performance of the PRTs in Afghanistan is 
dominated by stagnation with the danger that the situation can relapse in certain sectors. 
Real improvements beside the so-called initial successes of the PRTs cannot be 
recognized. The PRTs are in saturation regarding the effectiveness of their respective 
activities and projects. 
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter is an attempt to reflect perceptions of the activities of the PRTs in 
Afghanistan with a remarkably subjective hallmark. Nevertheless, the message behind the 
given trends is important. The result is sobering and the seventeen reports are 
representative enough to prove the arguments provided in Chapter III of this thesis. The 
capabilities of the PRTs are limited. The PRTs are a very suitable asset for post-conflict 
scenarios to fill the gap when situations are mostly calm and conditions have been 
prepared for short term reconstruction projects, at least until a solid fundament has been 
established. Then development projects focusing on long-term impacts can relieve 
stability and military reconstruction efforts can be dominated by PRTs. The main 




• The Afghanistan Compact is the most recent document that has 
determined benchmarks for Afghanistan. 
• The performance criteria with the assigned indicators are an attempt to 
assess the performance of PRTs. They are based on existing literature and 
are developed further on to avoid redundancies. 
• The overall assessment of the performance of PRTs is sobering based on 
various reports from IOs and NGOs from 2006 and earlier. 
• This assessment is evidence for the structural limitations of the PRTs, 
which are in saturation after having gained initial successes. 
Consequently, capabilities have to be added and/or withdrawn from the 
PRTs or the entire PRT has to be replaced by other assets. A highly 
mobile QRF including air assault assets have to stand by on the RC level 
in every case as an in-theatre tactical reserve. 
• PRTs within their current concept are only an asset for a small transitional 
phase in post-conflict scenarios. 
The next chapter analyzes influencing factors in certain contexts. Chapters III and 
IV focus on the PRTs themselves, their internal structure and capabilities and their 
external perceptions within the international community and the Afghan population. 
However, PRTs become effective in environments that are not only determined by 
geopolitical conclusions but also consist of cultural, religious, economic and societal 
aspects of Afghanistan. These aspects provide several implications which cannot be 
neglected regarding the planning of military operations and development projects. Under 
consideration of these implications, final recommendations for the commitment in 
Afghanistan are suggested. 
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V. SETBACKS IN PRTS CAUSED BY EXTERNAL FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Afghanistan, violent activities have surged since 2006 accompanied by a 
resurgence of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extreme282 Islamic movements. In general, 
three major groups are active and promote instability in Afghanistan. These are the 
Taliban, the jihad network of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani (HQN) and the Hezb-e Islami 
(Party of Islam) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG). The Taliban are the focus of the next 
section, however, one has to differentiate today between the Taliban movement in 
Afghanistan, which is responsible for the bulk of the insurgency conducted within the 
country, and on the other side, the Pakistani Taliban movement (Tehrik-e Taliban 
Pakistan) under Baitullah Mahsud.283 The latter movement is active within Pakistan 
although both have their bases on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. Al-
Qaeda is linked closely to the Taliban, represents a major supporter for them and plays, 
therefore an important role in this context. However, they cannot be compared to the 
other groups.284 
Secularism is unknown by these groups, and all can be categorized as extreme 
Islamic movements. The leadership of these groups interprets Islam in a certain way and 
motivates its followers to be good Muslims. Moreover, these groups struggle for power 
as they have done for more than two decades now, and they intend to establish a regime 
on the basis of a pure Islam. Thus, Islam appears as a political dimension, which also 
means that its leaders try to gain political control as well as political support. “In modern 
times, traditional Muslims seek hegemony over political, economic, and educational 
domains, leading to the establishment of authoritarian regimes in some Muslim countries 
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and widespread violence in others.”285 Unfortunately, the Taliban, HQN and HIG do not 
limit their activities to Afghanistan; they use Pakistan as well. Islamabad has been linked 
more strongly to the Taliban than to Kabul for two years “by claiming that Pakistan 
provides a reliable, safe, and fertile recruiting, training and fund-raising haven just across 
the border.”286 The ill-defined border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn in 1893 
and called the Durand Line, encompasses a salient feature, which is porosity. Therefore, 
the adjacent provinces on both sides of the border are very hospitable and suitable to 
those organizations applying insurgency tactics.287 
Islam and its political dimension is only one driving factor;  another one is 
tribalism, which has deep roots, especially in the borderland between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, At the same time, the tribal elder or malik was and still is the sole authority able 
to guide and influence the tribe in whatever direction is most fruitful and profitable. 
Therefore, the malik gains the undisputed loyalty of his tribesmen, ensures the cohesion 
of his tribe, and maintains therewith his power. However, during the Soviet occupation, 
the power shifted from the maliks to the mullahs (local religious teachers) due to a jihad 
conducted by the Mujahideen.288 The most prominent tribe, who inhabits both 
Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan is the 
Pashtun tribe.  
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 led quickly to the disbandment of the 
Taliban regime, though the coalition forces were able to prevent neither an extraction of 
experienced Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders in mid-November 2001 in Kunduz province 
by the Pakistani air force, nor the escape of Osama bin Laden, who retreated with a bunch 
of his most important fellows into the mountainous region of Tora Bora.289 All remnants 
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of the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda sought refuge in the provinces on both sides of the 
middle part of the Afghan-Pakistani border. These areas are all inhabited by the Pashtuns. 
Figure 14 shows the ethnicities in general and the Pashtun distribution in particular in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the designated part of the borderline.  
Figure 14.   Ethnicities and part of the Afghan-Pakistani border290 
 
Politics, religion and tribalism together lead to high dynamics in both countries 
and contribute to the volatile situation that prevails, especially in Afghanistan, where the 
state still lacks legitimacy, capacity and autonomy. The international military 
commitment in Afghanistan, with ISAF and the OEF mission, which contribute to the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have to face daily threats, which are posed by these 
movements and rooted in religious and tribal causes. Their activities can be categorized 
as insurgency tactics or guerilla warfare using all kinds of highly sophisticated 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as well as suicide bombings to nourish fear and 
instability and withdraw the legitimacy of the presence of the international community. 
Figures 15 and 16 provide an overview of the increased use of IEDs (Figure 15) and 
suicide bombings (Figure 16) in the last few years. 
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Figure 15.   Afghan IEDs291 
 
Figure 16.   Afghan Suicide Bombings292 
 
In this context, the central government in Kabul attempts to establish the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy combined with economic development. Not 
only have the political, ethnical, cultural and societal aspects affected the rebuilding of 
Afghanistan, but also the economy. Only a growing market with prosperous trade 
separate from the opium economy will allow the state to collect taxes, improve the 
employment situation and provide alternative livelihoods for the Afghan people. 
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Additionally, growing markets within a relatively secure situation will make the Afghan 
economy attractive for foreign investment. A sustainable economy will consequently lead 
to more development activities, and by collecting taxes, the government will be able to 
increase the wealth of the population through reimbursement. Thus, neither governance, 
security, ethnicity nor the economy may be neglected for the sustainable rebuilding and 
development of Afghanistan. All these pillars are intertwined and setbacks in one pillar 
will hamper the development in the other pillars. 
Only by analyzing the root causes will PRTs be able to operate adequately and  
effectively counter any insurgencies. Thus, the Taliban, HQN and HIG, including Al-
Qaeda, are analyzed in the context of Islamization293 and tribalism as well as in 
geopolitical circumstances. After that, the overall economic situation is analyzed as a 




The Taliban appeared on the scene at the end of 1994, especially in the vicinity of 
Kandahar, initially providing peace and security, although they did not come suddenly.294 
The Afghans suffered through wars for decades, either from their Mujahideen fight 
against the Soviet occupiers, or from their civil war and internal power struggles among 
the different warlords that arose after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of 
the Najibullah administration in 1992. In the mid-90s, the Afghans were war-torn and 
tired of suppression, war and violence. The Taliban initially disbanded warring tribal 
groups and fought against warlords such as Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek leader of the 
Northern Alliance, as well as Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Tajik hero who prevailed with 
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impressive leadership skills during the jihad against the Soviets, and who was the military 
commander of the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani. Moreover, they disarmed the adversaries, 
opened the roads, and enabled not only trade possibilities, but also the smuggling of 
goods with large income margins. Thus, the Afghans saw hope and a chance to maintain 
their livelihood. In 1997, the Taliban, the Islamic warriors, had established control over 
two-thirds of Afghanistan.295 
The majority of the Taliban personnel body has been young students of the Quran 
recruited from Islamic theology schools (madaris) along the Afghan-Pakistani border 
within or next to refugee camps. The ethnic group of the Pashtuns represents the majority 
of the Taliban. However, shortly after their initial successes, they “implemented an 
extreme interpretation of the sharia or Islamic law that appalled many Afghans and the 
Muslim world.”296 Even the prophet of Islam initially interpreted other tribes and 
religions, such as Christians and Jews, as natural allies and thus Mohammed accepted and 
approved of them.297 This message of tolerance and coexistence as traditional values of 
Islam was refused by the Taliban in a fundamentalist manner. The women were deeply 
suppressed by forbidding them to leave their homes and by closing down girls’ schools. 
Moreover, the Taliban banned all kinds of entertainment, media and activities that did not 
stick to their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.  
The origins of the Taliban movement can be drawn back to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and thus to December 1979. The movement began as a resistance against the 
Soviets in the vicinity of Kandahar and was based on the tribal network of the Durrani 
Pashtuns.298 Generally speaking, the Pashtuns can be subdivided into five major sub-
tribes; the Durranis (Abdalis), who are one of them, basically inhabit the southern part of 
Afghanistan around Kandahar and represent the ruling dynasty in Afghanistan. The 
Ghilzais are another sub-tribe, inhabit the eastern parts of the country, and have been the 
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warriors in the history of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are discussed more fully below.. The 
initial Taliban movement was limited to the vicinity of Kandahar and led by the 
respective chiefs of the Durranis and some senior religious scholars (ulema) who declared 
a tribal jihad. Moreover, the ulema brought in political parties to cover the political 
dimension of Islam. Two popular parties in southern Afghanistan with strong affiliations 
to the tribe were involved. First, Harakat-e Inquilab Islami (Movement of the Islamic 
Revolution) led by Maulvi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and secondly, another Hezb-e 
Islami (Party of Islam), which was led by Maulvi Younis Khalis (HIK). The latter split in 
1979 with Hekmatyar and established his own faction of the Hezb-e Islami. Both leaders 
have run their own madaris within the Pashtun belt.299 Mullah Omar, who became the 
spiritual leader of the Taliban movement and who was a village mullah in Singesar, 
Kandahar province running his own madrassa, joined Khalis’ faction of the Hezb-e 
Islami. As the war progressed, the tribes as well as the Islamic parties were not able to 
unite their efforts against the Soviet occupiers. The parties were stronger, emphasized the 
values of early Islam and marginalized the tribal structures. The parties and especially the 
Hezb-e Islami of Khalis “pursued a radical political ideology in order to bring about an 
Islamic revolution in Afghanistan.”300 The outcome was deep fragmentation instead of 
unity. Two camps occurred, the traditionalists and the Islamicists, and they fought each 
other mercilessly. 
The Taliban finally emerged on the scene in 1994. Meanwhile, the Soviets were 
forced to withdraw from Afghanistan by the Mujahideen, and the regime of President 
Najibullah collapsed in 1992. The Mujahideen captured Kabul that year and gained 
power by the venture of the Tajik forces under Burhanuddin Rabbani, his military 
commander, Massoud, and the Uzbek General Dostum, which was a trauma for the 
Pashtuns due to a non-Pashtun leadership in Kabul. However, the Rabbani government 
was not able to gain control over all of Afghanistan. The west was under the control of 
Ismael Khan, the east was controlled by a council of former Mujahideen commanders 
located in Jalalabad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was the leader of some provinces in the south 
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and east of Kabul, the Hazaras were in charge of central Afghanistan, and finally, the 
entire southern region around Kandahar was subdivided among several Mujahideen 
warlords. These warlords fought for individual supremacy and created conditions of 
anarchy in the vicinity of Kandahar.301 Daily life was dominated by violence and 
arbitrary acts such as the seizing homes and farms, abusing the population at will, 
kidnapping kids, robberies, fighting and looting in the streets.302 More people were 
seeking refuge in Pakistan and a lot of former Mujahideen rallied together and met 
Mullah Omar in Kandahar. They built a highly divergent group but merged into the 
Taliban movement after long discussions and declared their aims as “restore peace, 
disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character 
of Afghanistan.”303 Furthermore, they declared themselves an independent movement 
and split with the party. The initial leader of the Taliban movement was Mullah Omar, 
who named himself Leader of the Faithful (Amir-ul Momineen) after he had shown the 
Cloak of the prophet Mohammed to a crowd of his followers in 1996. The Shrine of the 
Cloak of the prophet Mohammed is located in Kandahar next to the tomb of Ahmad Shah 
Abdali (Durrani), the founder of Afghanistan. This is one of the holiest Islamic places to 
worship in Afghanistan. This procedure was conducted only on rare occasions throughout 
Afghan history, for instance in 1935 when the Afghans suffered from a cholera epidemic 
and requested help. Mullah Omar only showed the cloak at that time to increase his 
acceptance and to legitimize his role as the leader of the Taliban.304 The Taliban have 
their center of gravity in the rural areas in the south where the population is more 
conservative. Kabul is seen as the center of liberalism in the lens of the Taliban and both 
the socialist ideology as well as the traditional Islamic movement (Hanafi School of law) 
brought ruin and destruction to Afghanistan.305 
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The name Taliban stems from the word talib, meaning an Islamic student who 
seeks Islamic knowledge.306 The Taliban applied their fundamental Islamic approach, 
but, it is important to mention that, of course, not every talib is an insurgent, or even a 
terrorist, since the original intention of the Taliban movement was to restore law and 
order. 
2. Taliban’s Islamic Understanding 
The way the Taliban practice their Islamic fundamentalism can be described as 
aggressive, expansionist and uncompromising with the overall aim of a purified Afghan 
Islamic society as it was created at the time of the prophet Mohammed.307 Mohammed, 
as the messenger of God, was someone who did not evolve a new faith, but he was a 
reformer or revolutionist who changed the Arabian way of life. He also intended to purify 
society by banning polytheism and idolatry. Mohammed thought that the majority of the 
Arabian population lived in ignorance of God and His will and he defined the association 
of anything with God as the worst sin of all. Therefore, he conducted Islam as a 
reformation toward total affiliation and submission to God and His will. This required, 
and still requires from a Muslim, subordination as an individual and as part of the society 
due to the definition of a community or brotherhood of believers. By accepting this, the 
rule or the kingdom of God is established on earth. Consequently, this Islamic worldview 
already encompassed aspects of nation-building on a merged religious and political 
fundament. In the early days, Mohammed differentiated between believer and non-
believer, black or white, and nothing in between. Moreover, he expected that a Muslim 
had to emigrate away from the non-believer (hijra) and struggle against them (jihad) and 
even give his life for this purpose in order to establish God’s rule. This was seen as the 
ultimate profession of faith; the victim was rewarded with eternal life as a martyr. This 
early Islamic ideology offers a pattern of protest, resistance and revolutionary change.308  
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The practice of Islam for Muslims is of utmost importance due to the subservient 
character of Islam. Therefore, following Islamic law and the correct practices of Islam are 
crucial, although faith is inseparately linked to it.309 Consequently, Islamic law means in 
every case God’s will and is therefore His guidance. That is the path or the way, or in 
Islamic terms, sharia. It describes the expected behavior of the society of the believers, 
and is a common understanding in Muslim society, although there are different 
interpretations depending on which school of law310 one follows.311 Thus, the question is 
whether the Taliban practice their jihad correctly.  
Jihad means struggle and is part of the religious duties for every Muslim, although 
it is not one of the five pillars312 of Islam. Originally, jihad was the holy war; however, it 
can be characterized as a protection of Islam. Thus, it is self-preservation and an 
obligation for all Muslims, either as an individual or as part of the community. The jihad 
can be targeted against oneself or against an external individual, group, or organization 
that poses a threat to Islam. The struggle against oneself is called the “major” jihad as it is 
more difficult than fighting against an opponent. The other jihad, directed against others 
is called the “minor” jihad.313 Jihad does not necessarily mean to conduct a war, rather it 
is where a Muslims strives to become a better Muslim or to preserve Islam by education, 
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for instance, or by avoiding sins.314 It has to be emphasized that the call for jihad is not a 
small matter; rather it is a huge issue for Muslims. It can be compared to an emergency 
call for everybody. In every case, there has to be an Islamic authority who presents the 
competence to call for such a crucial religious duty.315 Who this authority can be varies 
with the different schools of law. In the Sunni schools of law, which have to be applied in 
the case of the Taliban, the leader of the Muslim community (umma) should be selected 
on the basis of the best suited and most feasible person. If the umma achieves consensus 
on this person and he or she fits into the political order, the next leader is chosen. A direct 
blood lineage to one of the first four caliphs is not necessarily required as the Shi’a do.316 
Consequently, after a group of Sunnis has chosen their leader, he can call for a jihad and 
therewith legalize it for the respective group. With this understanding and in this context, 
Mullah Omar was authorized to call for a jihad due to his acceptance as the spiritual and 
religious leader of the Taliban. Therefore, his call ensured that every follower of the 
Taliban was to conduct a jihad. The call for jihad is directed at every Muslim 
subordinated to the one who has called and legalized the jihad. Over the years, jihad was 
picked up within the Muslim Brotherhood and has become popular. As a result, the 
Western notion of jihad is negative, whereas the original Arabic meaning had  a positive 
character.317  
3. Islam in Afghanistan 
Since 1979, Islam has become a unifying force in Afghanistan and a solid part of 
Afghan daily life. However, the jihad represents a mobilizing factor to motivate the   
Afghans to fight for certain goals, sometimes based on dubious motives. However, Islam 
in Afghanistan, especially prior to 1979, has been very flexible and tolerant due to the 
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fact that 80 percent318 of the Afghan population sticks to the Hanafi school of law, which 
has traditionally dominated in the Arab Middle East. The Shi’a population in Afghanistan 
encompasses 19 percent.319 Hence, the Afghan population is relatively homogeneous 
regarding Islam. Islam did not face severe challenges in Afghanistan due to the presence 
of small minorities of non-Muslims.320 Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi school of 
law and a student of Ja’far al Sadiq, who was the founder of the Shi’a Jafari school of 
law, which is the most important among the Shi’a, developed Islam with regard to his 
own interpretation and in the context of a comprehensive way of life in the eighth 
century. Hanifa lived, practiced and taught in Kufa (today Iraq) although his family came 
originally from Kabul. He was influenced by several legal scholars, who were part of a 
younger Islamic community than in Medina. Thus, in his school of law, flexibility 
prevailed and he relied on jurist opinions and local law. However, in case of doubt he 
stuck to the consensus of the superior Medina law. The Hanafi school of law is easier to 
practice, has fewer restrictions, and encompasses more freedom and liberty as well as 
tolerance.321 
4. Islamization in Afghanistan 
Since 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, a process of Islamization 
occurred in Afghanistan. The Soviets intended to establish a socialist regime with Babrak 
Karmal as president and thus, spread their ideology of communism. This was seen as a 
threat to Islam and the Soviets were compared to unjust rulers. Islam requires, in this 
case, a resistance against the outsiders and consequently, the Mujahideen formed 
themselves into small units and started to rebel against the occupiers in the form of a 
jihad. The Mujahideen, “the soldiers of the Holy War—‘bandits’ in the eyes of the Soviet 
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Union but ‘freedom fighters’ to everyone else,”322 had already fearlessly fought the 
British in the nineteenth century in the first and second Anglo-Afghan War. This 
resurgence of the Mujahideen was accompanied by several internal and external 
dynamics, which have to be evaluated in this context. 
During the Soviet occupation, fundamental Islamicists appeared or became 
stronger. Hekmatyar and Massoud were the most prominent ones among them and both 
had fled to Pakistan by 1975 before the Soviet invasion took place.323 Since they were 
backed externally by the CIA, the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) and Saudi Arabia 
with funding and modern weaponry,324 both kept the jihad alive and especially 
Hekmatyar who was inspired by the ideology of the Pakistani Jamaat-ul Islami (JUI) 
party, who pursued fundamental political change in order to create a true Islamic 
society.325 Moreover, Hekmatyar received the bulk of the aid, which was basically 
guided by Zia ul-Haq, who became president in 1978 after a military coup in July 1977 in 
Pakistan.326 Zia-ul Haq was a devote Muslim and began immediately to implement Islam 
in Pakistani society, however, he gained sympathy from the West. In 1979, he 
promulgated “The National Education Policy and Implementation Program,” which 
defined the overall goal of education to “foster in students a loyalty to Islam, a sense of 
being a dutiful citizen of the Pakistani nation as a part of universal Ummah [Muslim 
community] with a full knowledge of the Pakistan movement, its ideological implications 
based on the precepts of the Quran and Sunnah.”327 Moreover, Zia-ul Haq implemented 
Islam politically as the core principle of his regime and thus, oriented Pakistan toward a 
fundamentalist understanding of Islam.328  
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Pakistan was a suitable opportunity to pose a counterweight against the Soviets’ 
spread of communism. Moreover, Pakistan intended to avoid a two-front conflict due to 
the alliance between the Soviet Union and India during the Cold War era. Therefore, Zia-
ul Haq was in favor of the uprising radical Islamicists, in general, and in Hekmatyar, in 
particular, because he pursued the same ideology as Zia-ul Haq.329 The United States’ 
interests and motivation were apparent. By using Pakistan as an executer against the 
invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a proxy war could easily be established by 
washing one’s hands of it. But moreover, the U.S. was also interested in the nuclear 
program of Pakistan, which had already been initiated during Bhutto’s reign.330 Saudi 
Arabia identified the leadership of Zia-ul Haq and Hekmatyar as a suitable window of 
opportunity for implementing their Wahhabi ideology of Islam in the society and guiding 
itback on the right path of Islam. The Wahhabi movement, founded in the eighteenth 
century by Abd al-Wahhab, was introduced because of a moral decline and deviation 
from the straight path of Islam in the community. Wahhab believed especially that the 
worship of tombs and other saints, which was common in the eighteenth century, was 
nothing but idolatry and thus, the worst sin in Islam, according to the belief in unity of 
God. Therefore, he created a social and moral revolution based strictly on the Quran and 
the examples of Mohammed and the Medinan community.331 All Muslims who resisted 
that practice were and still are considered to be non-believers (kafirs) and thus enemies of 
God. Wahhabism rejects everything except the pure Islam of Mohammed and his 
community. All other movements that may have occurred over the years are not accepted, 
including the Shi’a as well as the Hanafi schools of law and the mystic practices of the 
Sufi order, which prevailed in Afghanistan prior to 1979. Wahhabism today is 
represented in the state and society in Saudi Arabia.332 
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Besides that, internal dynamics occurred in Afghanistan as well. Other 
Mujahideens were guided by village mullahs, although they were often not really better 
educated than the Mujahideen fighters themselves.333 These mullahs joined more 
moderate Islamic parties after 1979. Since then until the end of the reign of the Taliban, 
the power centers shifted gradually away from the tribal elders (maliks or khans) and 
toward the mullahs and nothing was as it had been before. These events provide major 
reasons “why Islam has shifted from playing a relatively passive role toward an active 
role in integrating a diverse, multiethnic society.”334 The mullahs became more and more 
important as local religious leaders and their rise was nourished by the establishment of 
several religious madaris along the Afghan-Pakistani border where Islamic law has been 
stressed. The mullahs themselves autonomously increased their influence in the clergy as 
well as in politics and hence, a religio-political force appeared on the scene. Their role 
and influence over the society became even stronger under the Taliban regime, which, for 
instance, assembled jirgas (traditional assemblies comprised of tribal elders) only with 
mullahs. But even worse, this religious-political force with mullah leadership struggled 
for political power during the civil war in Afghanistan between 1992 and 1994 and 
concurrently, the traditional tolerance and flexibility of an ordinary Afghan practicing 
Hanafi disappeared. For the purpose of gaining power, Muslims fought Muslims 
throughout Afghanistan, and under the Taliban umbrella, massacres were conducted, 
such as the massacre of the Hazaras (Shi’a) in 1995. Islam was no longer a unifying force 
in Afghanistan and this religious-political force became a “lethal weapon in the hands of 
extremists, a force for division, fragmentation and enormous blood-letting.”335 
5. Madaris  
Since 1979 the number of madaris increased significantly in Afghanistan as well 
as in Pakistan, but they were concentrated along the border between the two countries. 
The system is not new, but was invented in the nineteenth century. A madrassa (plural is 
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madaris) literally means place of study and became a center of organized learning. The 
original curricula consisted of the Quran, the traditions of the prophet Mohammed 
(hadith), the jurisprudence (fiqh) as well as the Arabic language.336 During the Soviet 
occupation, mullahs ran their own madaris with specific curricula depending on who 
funded them and how many subsidies they received. Basically, the madaris were 
alienated to create jihadis and later under the Taliban regime to hold young personnel 
available for recruiting purposes rather than offering a broad education with religious 
aspects. Nevertheless, Zia-ul Haq, as well as Hekmatyar, saw education as the only 
suitable way to create radical Islamicists, which would consequently lead to a new 
Muslim society. However, only the younger generation was eligible for that education.337  
The Taliban later broke with that radical Islamicism as well as with traditional Islam in 
Afghanistan and Sufism. Their ideological foundation is an extreme form of 
Deobandism, which is a branch of the Hanafi school of law although they have 
interpreted and understand it in an extreme way. The origins of Deobandi Islam can be 
retraced to Deoband near New Delhi, where in the nineteenth century, the first Deoband 
madrassa was established. The followers intended to unite Muslim society in British 
India to learn how to live in a colonial state and how to encounter non-Muslim rulers. 
Their religious curriculum was based on the interpretation of the sharia, which mirrored 
the realities of that time. Moreover, the Deobandis embraced a restrictive role for women, 
and rejected all kinds of hierarchy among Muslims as well as the Shi’a. In 1879, 12 years 
after the first madrassa was founded, twelve madaris were run in British India, which 
were also joined by several Afghan students. In 1967, 9,000 madaris had been opened 
across South Asia; however, most Deobandi madaris were created in Pakistan after they 
gained independence in 1947. The radical movement of the JUI was founded in the 
Deobandi madaris, which was turned into a political party in 1962 by its founder 
Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi.338 During the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 
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1980s, the JUI, especially the faction led by Maulana Fazlur Rehmen Khalil,339 which 
was in favor of the Pashtun tribe inhabiting the region along the Pakistani-Afghan border, 
opened hundreds of madaris in the North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and in 
Baluchistan.340 The number of Deobandi madaris in Pakistan rose exponentially and the 
liaison between mullahs and the Mujahideen grew permanently during the 1980s. In the 
meantime, most of the madaris were run by mullahs who were not well educated and who 
did not know much about the original character of Deobandism. Under their leadership, 
education was reduced to learning reading and writing and about an idealistic Islam 
without any practical and realistic connections. Their aim was solely to train a new 
generation of Muslims prepared to fill a gap after the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan 
ended. Although they still labeled themselves madrassa, the real character gradually 
changed to a training camp teaching military tactics and techniques.341 The majority of 
these madaris was established next to refugee camps in which women with their children 
and orphans that fled from the Soviets, arrived.342 These kids, mixed with poor Pakistani 
boys and girls, joined the madaris as their only chance to receive an education. This 
generation, missing their fathers who were fighting as Mujahideens against the Soviets, 
did not know anything about tribal culture or Islam, which they would normally have 
learned in their family environment. Consequently, they were prone to that idealistic 
teaching of Islam and assumed it as reality with no connection to tribal customs and 
family life. 
The Taliban base their ideology primarily on Deobandi Islam, however, Deobandi 
was mixed up in the madaris with its own interpretation of the sharia and the 
Pashtunwali, the code of honor of the Pashtuns, which is explained below. Moreover, a 
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fundamentalist understanding of the Hanbali school of law343 as well as Wahabbism, due 
to the funding of the Saudis, was added. These madaris “became a major training ground 
for Taliban leadership.”344 The madaris evolved over the years and some of them to 
highly sophisticated schools such as the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania, which promotes cadre 
students especially for Taliban leadership. This school, located in Akhora Khatak in the 
NWFP, consists of a boarding school and a high school with a capacity of nearly 2,500 
pupils, and additionally it offers an eight-year masters’ program as well as a PhD 
program when the residence time is prolonged for two more years. Moreover, it has 
established a network of smaller madaris, which are closely linked to the superior school 
and which teach their curricula.345 Throughout Pakistan, a system of madaris prevails. In 
general, the ones that follow the Deobandi school are militant ones and it was estimated 
in 2007 that they train approximately two million people in up to 6,000 madaris.346  
Consequently, this hotbed of the Taliban has to be withdrawn. Although the 
Pakistani government has established new laws to gain control over the madaris, the 
international community has to provide more aid in the form of an adequate number of 
education facilities teaching moderate curricula and with access to modern information 
sources such as the Internet. If Pakistan closed all the madaris by force, thousands of 
children would have no opportunity to join any school and thus would become illiterate. 
Therefore, adequate substitutes in form of other schools are crucial. This approach will 
only be helpful when further development projects such as roads, public transportation 
and communication means are initiated. Additionally, a perspective for after school is 
also vital, which means that job opportunities have to be created. As previously 
mentioned, not all Taliban are insurgents or terrorists. The Taliban represented an official 
political regime in Afghanistan and, therefore, moderate Taliban have to be involved in  
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current politics in Afghanistan by participation in the government. The Afghan 
constitution allows parties that are not against the holy religion of Islam,347 which is in 
the case of the Taliban, accurate. 
Moreover, the madaris share the same ideological values and are, therefore, not 
only training ground for the Taliban leadership, but also a recruiting ground for Taliban 
fighters. The Taliban originated in the Pashtun tribal areas and the majority of the 
madaris has found its location within the Pashtun belt on both sides of the border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The political dimension of Islam, as developed by the Taliban, 
is therefore directly intertwined to the Pashtuns, which means to tribal structures and an 
environment in which loyalty and commitment is guaranteed to the clan. Traditional 
tribal understanding rejects huge authorities and strong centralized states. The clash of 
the Taliban authorities and policies with the Pashtun tribal customs and practices makes 
the situation even more complex and difficult to understand. 
C. PASHTUN 
1. Origins  
Tribes in general and the Pashtuns in particular have had more than direct impact 
on political life in Afghanistan for nearly 300 years. “Afghan political life has sometimes 
been represented as being a ‘recurrent process of fission and fusion,’ where the 
integrating tendency of the state is opposed to the centrifugal force of the tribes.”348 
The Pashtuns look back on a long tradition as an ethnic group although they have 
played an important political role in Afghanistan since the mid-eighteenth century.349 All 
Pashtuns link themselves to Qais Abdur Rashid who was a companion of the prophet 
Mohammed. Homogeneity has not prevailed among them regarding, for instance, the 
language. Not every Pashtuns is able to speak Pashto. The Pashtuns can be subdivided 
into five major sub-tribes. They are the Durranis (Abdalis), the Ghilzai, the Sarbani, the 
                                                 
347 Johnson, Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War, 10. 
348 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present, 7. 
349 Thomas J. Barfield, “Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies 37, no. 
2 (2004), 268. 
 118
Ghurghusht and the Karlanri tribes, where the permanently smoldering conflict between 
the first two is the best documented.350 The Ghilzais have been the traditional warriors in 
Pashtun history, always fighting for independence and against internal and external 
authorities who intended to subdue them. The Mughals as well as the Safavids in the 
early eighteenth century, and the British, had this experience during the first351 and 
second352 Anglo-Afghan wars.353 However, the Ghilzais were always satisfied when the 
suspicious outsiders had been defeated or forced to withdraw. They never claimed to rule, 
although they tried to do so after they defeated the Safavids in 1711. They were not 
successful in establishing an effective rule and thus, various powerful tribes arose from 
the political weakness of the Ghilzais. One of those tribes is the Abdali Pashtuns, which 
has been successful in establishing an effective administration. From this tribe, Ahmed 
Khan Abdali declared the Durrani empire in 1747 and the Durranis proved their ability to 
create state structures as well as an effective Pashtun rule. From that time onward, 
modern Afghan history begins and the Durranis have taken over the role of the Afghan 
rulers.354 This conflict is now 300 years old and the Ghilzais inhabit, meanwhile, the 
eastern provinces and the Durranis’ center of gravity is in Kandahar, in the southern part 
of Afghanistan. Figure 17 shows the present dispersion of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. 
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Figure 17.   Present Pashtun dispersion in Afghanistan and Pakistan355 
 
2. Internal Structure and Organization  
The Pashtuns are a segmentary ethnic group. Understanding this social behavior 
pattern is of utmost importance in order to to determine whether they defect or cooperate 
with external authorities. The segmentary lineage system leads to a leaderless society, 
which means that no hierarchy exists.356 Therefore, it is in the nature of the Pashtuns to 
reject higher authorities. “This characteristic makes Pashtuns the perfect insurgents.”357 
The segmentary societies organize themselves by an ideology of kinship. Consequently, 
the family is the smallest unit of these societies and the nearer the relative the more 
loyalty he (usually) or she gets. Also, in cases of disputes, a brother should help his 
brother against a cousin, for instance, who is further away. Thus, each person can identify 
his position in a segmentary lineage system by genealogy.358 Pashtuns are acting within 
this segmentary lineage system and it expands concentrically around the family with “the 
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extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy and major cultural-linguistic group.”359 The 
segmentary structure of the Pashtuns is the reason why external authorities, whether 
foreign invaders or the current central government in Kabul, lacks legitimacy. Figure 19 
shows the segmentary lineage system and Figure 18 offers a simplistic model of the 
concentric circles of the extended family. Figure 18 shows, additionally, that policies of 
the central government in Kabul are ineffective as long as they do not reach the core of 
these circles. 





Figure 19.   Segmentary Lineage System361 
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Besides the internal organization of the Pashtuns, which promotes a rebellious 
behavior in the form of an insurgency, for instance, the penetration of their areas of life, 
by attempts to govern or administer those areas, directly provokes the Pashtun code of 
honor, the so called Pashtunwali. 
3. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)  
The Taliban originated from the Pashtun tribe and especially after 9/11, the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda network was torn apart and pushed into the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan as well as in the eastern provinces of 
Afghanistan along the border between both countries. These areas are inhabited by 
several Pashtun sub-tribes. Figure 20 provides a rough overview of the Pashtuns in the 
designated borderland. One can find the Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, Turis, Wazirs, 
Mahsuds as well as the Bitanis. The latter ones are Ghilzai Pashtuns whereas the 
Mohmands belong to the Sarbanis tribe. The other four tribes are part of the Karlanri 
tribe, which inhabit both sides of the border and are considered the wildest tribal 
groups.362  
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Figure 20.   Pashtun sub-tribes in FATA363 
 
These inhomogeneous tribes in FATA are not governed directly; however, the 
Pakistani government has established four pillars to execute control over those areas. 
These pillars are the political agent,364 the maliks,365 the Frontier Crime Regulation366 
and the Frontier Corps.367 All four pillars are linked together and if one gets weakened it 
has a direct impact on all the others. Due to the power shift from the maliks to the 
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mullahs since 1979, it is the pillar of the maliks that is currently the weakest. In reality, 
the governance and control over those areas and those tribes is extremely difficult, 
perhaps even impossible due to the non-permissive terrain, the porous character of the 
border and the segmentary structure of the tribes. The tribes do not care about the border 
between the countries, which were delineated in 1893 and which are also known as the 
Durand Line. Besides the fact that the Durand Line is in permanent dispute between 
Kabul and Islamabad, it does not follow tribal areas, but rather geographical 
requirements.368 Daily life can be portrayed as frequent border crossings on several 
unmanned passes for the purposes of economic trade, employment, family meetings, etc., 
but also for uncovered penetration of the countries and smuggling. The entire region is 
underdeveloped; the people are poor and illiterate, but on the other hand, very proud.369 
The Taliban as well as the Al-Qaeda network and other terrorist elements have not only 
found sanctuary in those areas, but also suitable bases for command and control issues, 
recruiting, and training as well as planning and conducting new operations.370 These 
elements continue to use their already (prior to 2001) established network of madaris and 
their religious-political force to suppress traditional tribal structures.371 Consequently, the 
role of the maliks has to be strengthened. The maliks have to be able to practice their role 
as the tribal elders and also as the main contributors to stability if external forces have 
won their hearts and minds. 
4. Pashtunwali  
The reason why the Taliban are hosted in the Pashtun-settled areas is due to the 
Pashtunwali and their code of honor, or social code. The Pashtun society is 
fundamentally bound to this code, which determines its behavior and identity. A Pashtun 
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has to stick to this code to maintain his honor, because honor is the overarching attribute 
of a person in the Pashtun rural and tribal environment. A person without honor is a non-
person and someone who will be completely ignored. The Pashtunwali is the strongest 
force in the tribal areas that can facilitate and maintain law and order.372 Consequently, 
tribalism was, is, and will definitely continue to be a unifying force in Afghanistan. 
Besides some core values of the Pashtunwali such as “self-respect, independence, 
justice, hospitality, forgiveness, and tolerance,”373 the Pashtunwali create some 
mandatory duties for the individual. The institution that judges law and order is the jirga. 
The jirga’s final sentence is based on the principle of consensus and is binding for the 
persons who are affected. This approach of social correlation is contradictory to Western 
understandings of independent judiciaries, however, it is a fundamental element in these 
tribal societies and it is vital to strengthen the jirgas and draw them into the nation-
building process in Afghanistan. 
The Pashtunwali refers to other individual principles such as freedom, honor, 
revenge and chivalry. The Pashtuns are proud of their freedom and will never tell another 
person what to do. Personal honor (nang) has to be maintained for a Pashtun. Nang can 
be violated by injuring one’s wealth (zewar), land (zar) or women (zan). If one of these 
factors is violated by an external force, the Pashtunwali requires a counter-action to 
restore nang. This action is called badal (revenge), which literally means exchange or 
revenge in the sense of killing or vendetta.374 Another concept of the Pashtunwali is 
hospitality (melmastia) and refuge (nanawatey). This has to be provided to everyone who 
is asking for it independently whether the person is a stranger, foreigner or enemy. In the 
sense of the Pashtunwali, nanawatey is an indicator for mercy. Melmastia and nanawatey 
have to be provided for a limited time, however, even if it means risking your own life.375 
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These factors invoke a certain behavior of the Pashtuns that cannot be changed by 
an external policy or law. The Pashtuns are inevitably bound to this behavioral code. 
Consequently, all external actions affecting the Pashtuns have to be considered in terms 
of the Pashtunwali to evaluate the expected reaction. 
D. HAQQANI, HEKMATYAR AND AL-QAEDA 
The three groups HQN, HIG and Al-Qaeda (AQAM) are also operating from the 
borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All are tremendous contributors to 
instability, not only in Afghanistan, but in the case of Al-Qaeda, worldwide. Figure 21 
shows the areas of influence of these groups. All movements cumulate in FATA and the 
eastern provinces of Afghanistan where the Pashtun dominate and where the specifics of 
both, FATA and the Pashtun tribes have to be applied as discussed above. 
Figure 21.   Areas of influence376 
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HQN, HIG and Al-Qaeda have established their homes in the border region from 
where they operate and conduct the Afghan insurgency practice mujahideen-style guerilla 
warfare.377 HQN and HIG are not only Islamist movements, but also Pashtun 
movements.378 Consequently, jihad and badal can be evoked together and the motivation 
and mobilization is either religious or tribal-based. Both movements are extreme in 
seeking to purify the Afghan society from all sins. They apply the original Islam of the 
prophet Mohammed.  
Al-Qaeda is globally oriented, however, they profit from weak governments in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, who lack the capacity to conduct effective counter measures 
against them. Al-Qaeda’s aim is to free the Arab and Islamic world from Western 
penetrations and, therefore, conducts jihad wherever it is necessary.379 
However, the roots of these movements, compared to the Taliban, are the same. 
Additionally, their bases and safe havens are located in the same areas where the Taliban 
has also found refuge and the alienation of the Pashtuns is also the same. This means 
encountering the roots of the Taliban movement leads automatically to a withdrawal of 
the hotbeds for these movements. 
E. ECONOMY 
Afghanistan’s economy has been growing in recent years.380 This statement is, of 
course, too simplistic, and needs more analytical depth. The central government in 
Afghanistan has presented the Afghanistan National Development Strategy381 (ANDS) as 
an interim strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction, 
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which is a medium-term vision describing the fiscal framework until March 2010.382 
Additionally, this document reflects the “strategic priorities and mechanisms for 
achieving the Government’s development vision.”383 The Afghanistan Compact, which is 
the succeeding document of the Bonn Agreement and “provides a framework for the 
international community to help Afghans build a state and develop their countries,”384 
defines benchmarks on certain sectors, which should basically be fulfilled by 2010. 
Neither the ANDS nor the Afghanistan Compact is subject to this work; however, they 
represent the strategic basis for Afghanistan’s development. The economy plays an 
important role within both documents. Afghanistan’s economy can generally be 
subdivided between the opium and non-opium economy. Both are analyzed with the 
following sections whereas the black market, which consists of more than poppy 
cultivation, drug production and trafficking, is mentioned briefly because it is an issue 
specifically related to Afghanistan and contributes tremendously to the Afghan economy.  
1. Economic Visions due to the ANDS and the Afghanistan Compact  
The Afghan government’s economic goal, defined in the Afghanistan Compact, is 
to pursue high rates of sustainable economic growth, which should be fulfilled with the 
support of the international community. This should be realized by promoting the role 
and the potential of the private sector in accordance and ensuring macroeconomic 
stability. Concurrently, the Afghan government intends to stimulate the public and non-
profit sector as well, and attempts to curb the narcotics industry by accepting that this 
sector cannot be substituted or even eliminated easily. For the purpose of economic and 
social development, the Afghan government has defined six sectors. These are: 
• Infrastructure and natural resources 
• Education 
• Health 
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• Agriculture and rural development 
• Social protection 
• Economic governance and private sector development. 
The first, fourth and sixth points can obviously be assigned to economic 
development. The benefits of a growing economy should be redistributed to the Afghans 
in order to increase their wealth.  The overall goal is to use the revenues to reduce 
hunger, poverty and unemployment.385 Tables 21 to 23 provide an overview of the 
determined benchmarks regarding the above mentioned first, fourth and sixth points. 
Table 21.   Benchmarks for Infrastructure and Natural Resources386 
Infrastructure and natural resources: 
Scope Benchmark 
Roads Ring road and connecting roads from foreign 
countries fully upgraded and maintained by 
the end of 2008. 
Air transport Kabul International Airport (KAIA) and 
Herat Airport (HA) fully operational by the 
end of 2010. Other domestic airports will 
follow. 
Energy 65% of households, 90% of non-residential 
establishments in major urban areas, and 
25% of households in rural areas will be 
supplied with electricity by the end of 2010. 
Mining and natural resources Regulations for profitable extraction of 
minerals and natural resources will be 
established by the end of 2006. 
Water resource management Irrigation and potable water supply strategies 
by end-2006. Waterworks for 30% of the 
water supply by the end of 2010. 
Urban development Municipal governments will have the 
capacity to manage urban development and 
to ensure that municipal services are 
delivered effectively, efficiently and 
transparently by the end of 2010. 
Environment An environmental regulatory framework and 
management will be established by the end 
of 2007. 
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Table 22.   Benchmarks of Agriculture and Rural Development387 
Agriculture and rural development: 
Scope Benchmark 
Agriculture and livestock Framework for an increased production 
and productivity for legal agriculture and 
for agriculture-based rural industries as 
well as an increase of public investment in 
agriculture by 30% each year will be 
established by the end of 2010. 
Comprehensive rural development Community Development Councils will be 
created with the election of at least 14,000 
volunteers to coordinate and promote local 
governance and community empowerment 
with the aim of ensuring access to potable 
water, sanitation, road connectivity, access 
to markets, employment and social 
services, irrigation and access to financial 
services for over 38,000 villages by the 
end of 2010. 
Counter-narcotics Strategies and programs will be 
implemented to reduce the amount of land 
under poppy cultivation by strengthening 
of licit livelihoods and other counter-
narcotics measures by the end of 2010. 
Table 23.   Benchmarks of Economic Governance and Private Sector 
Development388 
Economic governance and private sector development: 
Scope Benchmark 
Financial management Transparent financial management at 
central and provincial levels will be 
established by the end of 2007, agreed on 
and monitored by the international 
community. 
Domestic revenues Afghanistan’s total domestic budgetary 
revenue will reach 8% of GDP and the 
revenues/expenditures ratio will rise to 
58% by 2011. 
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Private sector development and trade Regulations and procedures related to 
easier investments will be implemented by 
the end of 2007. Divestments of state-
owned enterprises will be realized by the 
end of 2009. 
Financial services and markets Regulations regarding all core sectors of 
banking and non-bank financial institutions 
will be developed by the end of 2007. 
Regional cooperation Cooperative border management and 
multilateral or bilateral agreements 
regarding transit and trade will be 
negotiated by the end of 2010. 
 
The above mentioned benchmarks and goals have already partially expired and 
thus, should have been implemented. However, 2010 and 2011 have been determined as a 
kind of culminating point in the strategy when several measures should become effective. 
How realistic this is will depend heavily on the assistance provided by the international 
community on this sector and on the number of donor nations and foreign investment that 
will bring capital into the country and the markets. Consequently, this vision requires 
assistance and guidance with economically qualified personnel and not with military 
personnel. The designated personnel should be assigned to the central government 
because an approach from the center to the provinces seems to be the most suitable for 
implementing all the necessary regulations and for negotiating all the required 
agreements.  
2. Current Economic Situation  
The economic situation currently prevailing in Afghanistan has to be seen in 
relation to the initial point. In this case, the initial point refers to the Soviet occupation 
beginning in 1979 and the subsequent civil war, as well as the rule of the Taliban regime, 
when a functional economy was completely eroded. Thus, the economic growth under the 
Karzai administration hustles in tremendous steps and shows growth rates up to 
approximately 13 percent.389 Nevertheless, Afghanistan is an economic dwarf. The  
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following quote precisely describes the situation since the communist coup, also named 
the Sawr revolution, from 1978, that took place in Afghanistan when the empowering 
regime backed the Soviets, which eventually led to the Soviet invasion in 1979. 
“The successive wars killed over a million Afghans, most of them civilians; 
maimed and orphaned over a million people, leaving many families without 
breadwinners; forced about a third of the population into exile as refugees; devastated the 
villages where most of the population lived; and drove much of the country’s educated 
class into exile. Agricultural land and pastures were often mined and became 
unproductive. Fragile systems for managing the country’s scarce supplies of water were 
devastated. In the course of foreign invasion and interference, most of the roads, bridges, 
and culverts that this landlocked country had managed to build were destroyed. The few 
roads and bridges that remained were not maintained. Afghans were unable to use many 
schools and clinics, which had degenerated into dilapidated structures, unsuitable for 
their intended purposes. In the course of the war, schools and hospitals were burned down 
or converted into military bases. One generation or more lost the chance for education. 
Male-headed families that had supported the gradual education and employment of 
women now confined them once again, out of fear for their safety. This led to a reversal 
in the modest advances that had been made by Afghan women.”390 
Beginning with the Soviet occupation, the Afghan economy began to gradually 
collapse. The Soviets implemented their system of planned economy, and thus increased 
the role of the state in the economic sector by decreasing skilled economic personnel who 
were either in refugee camps or imprisoned. Subsequently, the initiation of domestic 
revenues had been neglected, but the need for money arose due to tremendous 
expenditures for weapons and military equipment, as well as for food subsidies. The 
result was hyperinflation because the communist regime in Kabul started printing huge 
numbers of new banknotes. The occurrence of hyperinflation had a direct impact on the 
public sector because state officials, teachers, policemen, and so on were suddenly no 
longer able to insure their livelihoods. Thus corruption spread widely in the public sector. 
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During these years, huge amounts of subsidized food were imported and had to be 
distributed, which heavily damaged the economy Providing food to the population 
depressed agricultural markets and the people still today expect  the state to supply them 
with food.391 
Afghanistan’s economy of 2001 and 2002 can be compared to a wartime economy 
dealing with drugs, guns, and religious artifacts.392 The economy can generally be 
divided into a legal and a black market economy. The main source of income of the black 
economy is drug-trafficking and illegal transportation.393 This market has become the 
only eligible and well-paid employment for a significant part of the Afghan population. 
Opium cultivation and processing it into heroin in the labs throughout the country is a 
worthwhile business because it has tremendous profit margins. Not only has the drug 
economy formed the criminal or black economy of Afghanistan, but also smuggling for 
instance timber, gemstones, and fuel from Iran have been remarkable factors.394 The 
poppy sector is mainly controlled by regional leaders, warlords and militias, who pursue 
their own interests and motives. Not only in 2001, when the Taliban regime was defeated, 
but also in 2002, 2003 and the subsequent years, under the respective government the 
production of opium rose tremendously.395 “This (6100 tons of opium production in 
2005) made up a staggering 92 percent of total world supply and exceeded total global 
consumption by 30 percent. This represented a farm gate value of USD 755 million, or 11 
percent of Afghanistan’s official GDP.”396 This indicates that the opium production in 
Afghanistan is so significant that regional commanders, who are involved in this, have 
established their own economy. The state has, of course, no benefit from this because it 
can not apply taxation on this capital. Although the Afghan police supported by ISAF 
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forces, “combat the narcotics industry,”397 it is not possible to interrupt this business 
without creating an adequate substitution because it is a vital economic base from which 
a lot of people maintain their livelihood Even if the police, supported by the international 
military presence, conducted poppy eradication operations, counter-measures including 
the use of violence would occur and instability would be the result. Regarding the legal 
economy, the main economic sector is agriculture in which crop shortfalls are not unusual 
due to droughts and limited available fields because of the mountainous and cleft 
topography in Afghanistan. Additionally, the country suffers from the plague of 
landmines which were inherited from the Soviet occupation and limit the available fields. 
Afghanistan’s economy is also growing by 13.8 percent in 2005, for example, and at an 
average of 12 percent over the past four years.398 Additionally, it is expected that the real 
GDP growth for 2008 will exceed 13 percent.399 Figure 22 provides an overview of 
Afghanistan’s economic indicators from 2002 to 2006, which underlines the above 
mentioned facts. 
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Figure 22.   Afghanistan’s Economic Indicators from 2002 to 2006400 
 
However, this growth rate has to be related to the initial point of the economy 
after the Taliban regime, which was a very low level economy. Although the markets are 
opened, Afghanistan’s economy is still in an early stage of development and prone to 
external influences which underscore the vulnerability of Afghanistan economically. In 
2007, the inflation rate was 17 percent due to the higher prices of imported fuel and 
food.401 Furthermore, the redistribution to the population in March 2008 was 
approximately 60 percent, 6 percent higher than one year before, however, this was only 
possible with remarkable international assistance. It is expected that revenue collection 
will be 8.2 percent of the GDP in 2008, which will meet the benchmarks of the 
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remains one the lowest worldwide.402 Nevertheless, each fulfillment of benchmarks of 
the Afghanistan Compact is a signal that it might be a realistic roadmap to rebuilding not 
only Afghanistan’s economy, but also the other sectors as well. 
Unfortunately, domestic and foreign investments in Afghanistan are very rare 
because of the unstable security situation, not only throughout the countryside but also in 
the major cities.403 Due to the fact that Afghanistan is not a self-supporter, it is reliant on 
foreign donations, especially in the economic sector. Therefore, Afghanistan is still and 
will stay a Rentier state. Excluding the financial obligations against Russia, another 
economic issue is that Afghanistan suffers from the payback of debts, which amounts to 
nearly 13 percent of the GDP in 2005.404  
Afghanistan is very poor and highly indebted. An estimated 34  to 42 percent of 
the country’s population live under the poverty level, and without adequate assistance, 
donations and qualified aid, the Afghan economy can probably not be re-stimulated or 
become a self-sustaining economy.  
3. Macroeconomic Aspects  
The long-term impacts on Afghanistan’s economy, inherited from nearly thirty 
years of war, civil war, occupation, suppression, violence, and poverty, as well as 
invasions and remote regimes, now pose tremendous challenges to the attempts of the 
central government in Kabul and to the international community to re-stimulate the 
Afghanistan economy. These costs have resulted in a lost generation and thus, a lack of 
qualified and highly sophisticated personnel to deal with the economy issues. 
Nevertheless, an economy with high growth rates, along with new structures and high 
value exports, is crucial for the overall rebuilding efforts of Afghanistan. For this 
purpose, a stable macroeconomy is vital. 
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The data on the GDP has already been mentioned in the section above. The 
growth of the economy and the increase of the GDP over the last few years is the 
outcome of  four basic factors. From 2003 to 2006, high amounts of rainfall occurred 
contrary to the five years beforehand when drought had been the predominant factor. 
Consequently, the agricultural sector was able to produce much more output. The rapid 
growth of the opium economy has two sides of the coin. It contributes overwhelmingly to 
Afghanistan’s economy, but on the other side, it is a remarkable factor in destabilizing 
the country. However, this appearance underscores the dependence of Afghanistan’s 
economy on this sector, which poses significant challenges to the government regarding 
its abolition, or at least, substitution. Moreover, the international grants and the return of 
thousands of economic refugees have contributed to the growth rates. Additionally, the 
government has lifted some constraints on investments in the private sector, which have 
led to higher employment rates and economic activity.405 
Afghanistan’s economy suffers from parallel governance structures and weak 
state capacities in which corruption prevails and reforms are conducted. The parallel 
structures of the informal and illicit economy operate beside taxation. This structure is 
strengthened by regional commanders who have control over certain parts of the illicit 
economy of Afghanistan, which is not only the opium economy. Consequently, the 
economy can be portrayed as unproductive, or with a low level of productivity. The latter 
factor, in combination with the already mentioned poor services provided by weak 
government institutions, has a direct impact on the overall growth of the economy. 
Assuming that a long-lasting drought might occur, the international grants decline, and 
that no more economic refugees return, a decline of growth rates is likely.406 This means 
that a stable macroeconomy, along with a strong regulatory framework, functioning 
financial services, sustainable markets, as well as improvements on the security situation, 
which will lead to more foreign investments, are compulsory prerequisites for ensuring 
positive growth rates over the coming years. Figure 23 shows the macroeconomic context 
of Afghanistan and the illicit production equilibrium. 
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Figure 23.   Macroeconomy and the Illicit Production Equilibrium407 
 
International grants are also a vital factor in Afghanistan’s economy due to the 
fact that government revenues fund approximately 50 percent of its expenditures. Thus, 
Afghanistan without grants would not be sustainable.  For instance, in 2005, 269 million 
USD were collected by the Afghan government, whereas the expenditures were 561 
million USD in the same year. This would not have been possible without an external 
budget of 3,742.4 million USD.  In that year, legal exports were 1,656 million USD; 
however, the final trade balance was negative due to imports of 3,867 million USD. That 
was a trade deficit of 45 percent of the GDP.408 Ultimately, it is correct to state that the 
economy is growing. Nevertheless, there are fields, which prevail with tremendously 
negative ratios that do not lead to a self-sustaining economy and must rely on 
international grants, aid and investments. It will be vital for the Afghan government to 
identify the respective sources of economic growth, which can vary year to year, to 
ensure persistently increasing growth rates and to be able to redistribute the revenues to 
reduce poverty and unemployment and promote development. Therefore, deep analysis 
and diagnostic work is necessary for which assistance is essential. 
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The Afghan economy is largely dependent on opium production. The UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) released their most recent report409 in cooperation with 
the Afghan government as a survey and assessment of drug production, and a prognosis 
of future trends for the winter of 2008, in which it was mentioned that poppy cultivation 
will slightly decrease in 2008, contrary to the previous years when it was increasing. The 
report differentiates between the respective provinces regarding the trend for 2008. 
Figure 24 shows these trends. 
Figure 24.   Trends of Poppy Cultivation for 2008410 
 
Additionally, the opium economy in 2005 earned 2.8 billion USD from which, of 
course, the drug barons and the traffickers benefit the most with 79 percent. The local 
farmers received only small margins and the benefits of cultivating the poppy is not given 
to each farmer equally either. The opium economy is a huge factor in Afghanistan.411 
Nevertheless, the Afghan government, assisted by the international community, is to 
strengthen its efforts to establish a legal framework to reduce poppy cultivation, drug 
production and trafficking. The effectiveness of the attempts to reduce poppy cultivation 
is heavily dependent on the farmer. Where farmers are poor, or where landless laborers 
are involved, the government has to develop and establish viable alternatives for the rural 
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poor to ensure their livelihoods.412 This will be tremendously challenging for the 
government to abolish or provide adequate substitution for poppy cultivation. If one were 
able to reject the ethical dimension, it would probably have been best to promote poppy 
cultivation instead of abolishing it. 
The non-opium economy of Afghanistan consists basically of the agricultural 
sector. Due to heavy rain falls, two-thirds of the economic growth from 2003 to 2006 was 
made by agriculture. In 2005, 37 percent of the GDP came from agriculture. Cereal crops 
are the primary product of this sector. Regarding this production, there are several 
programs to boost the productivity of cereals by providing suitable seeds, fertilizers and 
an improved irrigation system.413 Other sectors include manufacturing, construction and 
public administration. Figure 25 provides an overview of the structure of the Afghan 
economy as of 2003. 
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Figure 25.   Structure of the Afghan Economy as of 2003414 
 
4. Economic Execution  
The Afghan government, along with the support of the international community, 
has precise lines of operations on how to achieve high economic goals. The desired 
economic growth should not only be redistributed to the poor people, but also contribute 
to long-term stability through development. Therefore, Kabul focuses on the promotion 
of the private sector in terms of investment as well as production, while eliminating the 
narcotics economy, or even the illicit economy overall. 
Growth rates alone will not achieve these goals. The economic framework has to 
be established in a sustainable manner, which would enable a continuous increase over a 
certain period of time rather than being dependent on unpredictable rainfalls and foreign 
aid. The Afghan government estimated that an annual rate of real growth in the licit 
economy of 9 percent over a period of twelve years would meet the goals to reduce 
poverty, improve employment rates and contribute effectively to stability. This program 
is called “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” from 2004 (SAF 2004) and is based on a 
required per capita growth rate of 3 percent per year, which is equivalent to a 5 percent 
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real growth rate of the total economy assuming a conservative population growth rate of 
2 percent per year. The difference between the 5 percent real growth rate of the total 
economy and the estimated necessary growth rate of the licit economy of 9 percent are 
needed for the compensation of losses due to a planned reduction in the narcotics 
economy.415 Figure 26 provides an overview of the necessary and estimated growth rates 
as planned by the Afghan government. The years on the x-axis are as follows: 1382 is 
equivalent to 2003/2004, 1383 to 2004/2005, 1384 to 2005/2006 and so on. 
Figure 26.   Context of Real GDP Growth Rates416 
 
Besides the question of what the international military forces, in general, or PRTs 
in particular, can contribute to the promotion of the private sector, the Afghan 
government has determined four investment areas as sources of growth and assigned 
them respective priorities. These are first, agriculture, pastoralism and rural enterprises, 
second, the productive use of state assets, third, mining and extractive industries, and 
fourth, regional cooperation, trade and transit. 
Improvements in agricultural productivity are focused basically on the rural areas, 
where not only most Afghans live, but also where most poverty prevails. Therefore, this 
sector is the major contributor to economic growth. As mentioned above, Afghanistan 
has, besides the poppy cultivation, a long tradition of high-value horticultural crops. An 
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example of this sector is dried fruits and nuts. Those that have been grown in Afghanistan 
are considered the best quality in Asia and the Middle East. Another example is Afghan 
carpets, which are produced from the wool of the animals belonging to the herds of the 
full-time nomads. These carpets can be sold in the primary markets in the U.S. and in 
Germany for 800 to 900 USD per square meter.417 If these markets can be placed better 
in the global economy by improvements in infrastructure and competitiveness, the 
products could become export articles. 
The productive use of state assets means the sale of public land and the 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs). By doing so, the Afghan government 
expects development primarily in urban centers and a larger private sector, which enables 
more employment opportunities and more investment activities.418 
The third sector of economic growth is related to mining and extractive industries, 
which are all currently state property. The available resources are coal, quarry materials, 
marble and dimension stone, industrial minerals, semiprecious stones as well as some 
metals such as copper, iron ore and gold. All these resources and the necessary industry 
to extract it and to work it up are crucial for foreign investment and for foreign 
technological knowledge. For instance marble from Heart and Jalalabad, is of such a 
good quality that it can challenge the marble of Italy.419 
Finally, regional cooperation, trade and transit as a contributor to economic 
growth, is seen as a significant potential to raise revenues from rents and tolls on transit 
routes. A prerequisite for this is, of course, that the roads are in better condition and that 
an effective administration with a functioning toll procedure is established. Moreover, 
Afghanistan is landlocked, as are the adjacent countries to the north, which means that 
the historic role of Afghanistan as a corridor again comes into play. Domestic transport 
companies and workers might rise and provide logistics for goods that have to be 
transported through Afghanistan. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to reduce illegal 
                                                 




checkpoints run by local commanders collecting tolls for their own profit. Nevertheless, 
the corridors from Central Asia to the subcontinent and from the west to the east and vice 
versa have to be used for economic purposes. Not only might the transportation business 
be profitable, but also the pipeline projects currently planned. The Trans-Afghan Pipeline 
(TAP) should, in the future carry natural gas from Turkmenistan’s gas fields to Pakistan 
and potentially to India as well. The Afghan government has estimated that transit 
revenues could be 160 million USD.420 To realize these projects, it is crucial that the 
Afghan government improves its relations with its neighboring countries, especially 
Pakistan. Between them, the unresolved issue of the Durand Line and the question of the 
Pashtuns are still hampering trustful cooperation. 
The question as to what the PRTs contribute to the promotion of the Afghan 
economy is still left. NATO founded the “Afghan-First” program. This program is to 
promote the local Afghan economy and is, for instance, in the northern part of 
Afghanistan, a cooperation between ISAF, eleven local Afghan construction firms, the 
Afghan International Chamber of Commerce and the Balkh University. Whenever 
possible, the Afghan economy gets the benefits from the construction measures of the 
Forward Support Base (FSB) in Mazar-e Sharif, which is conducted by the local firms. 
Moreover, several workers are hired to support the camp commander by conducting daily 
business issues and every possible purchase is done within the local markets, even though 
the prices are higher than elsewhere. These above mentioned examples are only a few out 
of many. The program is headed toward the local economy and invests in local 
markets.421 
5. Conclusion  
The Afghan economy is growing. Yes, but as mentioned introductorily, this is too 
superficial. The macroeconomic approach is the correct beginning. Not only potential 
foreign investors, but also domestic economic people need a suitable and functioning 
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framework for investments and economic activities. However, an institutional framework 
is currently incomplete and has to be realized as determined in the Afghanistan Compact 
by the end of 2010. Moreover, other economic challenges are an insufficient 
infrastructure, and underutilized potentials such as electricity and irrigation, the illicit 
economy, which is dominated by the narcotics industry, as well as poverty, in 
combination, with too few qualified people or social capital. Moreover, the 
macroeconomic efforts are not good enough. For a sustainable economic growth, it is just 
as important to strengthen the microeconomics as well. Michael E. Porter has defined 
three stage of economic development through which countries evolve 
microeconomically.422 The first stage is the factor-driven economy. This stage is 
dominated by factors such as low-cost labor and access to natural resources that lead to 
competitive advantages and international products. Additionally, small firms produce 
simple products that are constructed or designed somewhere else. The second stage is the 
investment-driven economy in which manufacturing and services become more dominant 
and improve the advantages of economic competitiveness. The technology is usually 
bought and this stage requires significant improvements in the domestic infrastructure. 
However, it offers a chance to evolve on purchased technology and draw foreign 
investment into the country. The third stage is the innovation-driven economy. This final 
stage portrays an economy that is able to produce highly sophisticated technological and 
innovative products bargained on global markets. Two facts prevail: Afghanistan is 
currently in the first stage and their intention to promote the private sector requires severe 
efforts on microeconomic aspects rather than solely on the macroeconomic side. A 
favorable business environment for private and foreign investment is crucial. Thus, not 
only an efficient infrastructure and a functioning administrative framework are necessary, 
but also available capital, access to financial services, cheap labor, markets with global 
access, a stock of valuable natural resources, qualified personnel, sophisticated 
technologies, and education, as well as favorable conditions for the supporting industries, 
and state subsidies for certain sectors. Only by promoting all these aspects can a 
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sustainable economy grow. For Afghanistan, this is mandatory due to the fact that the 
economy is a major contributor to stability, although it requires a certain security level. 
F. CONCLUSION 
“The U.S. and NATO/ISAF are not winning in Afghanistan. […] The U.S. and 
NATO/ISAF are able to defeat the Taliban and other Islamist extremist movements at the 
tactical level, and have won important victories in 2007. However, the Taliban still seem 
to be winning the battle for political and economic space. The U.S., NATO/ISAF, and 
Afghan forces are not strong enough to hold large areas after the win.”423 
Islam is the second largest religion in the world and the tribal affairs of the 
Pashtun, which embrace approximately 25 million members and are therefore the largest 
tribal group in the world,424 clash in Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Both lead to 
insurgency based on different motivators and both can mobilize the masses. This poses 
not only a threat to the international community present in Afghanistan and the central 
government in Kabul, but also to the entire world. Consequently, NATO’s policies have 
to be directed not against them, but with them. 
Afghanistan’s economy is crucial for promoting stability. It is no less important 
than political, religious and tribal aspects. The most challenging issue is the gradual 
reduction or even abolition of the illicit economy, basically the narcotics industry, by 
developing a sustainable legal economy. Unfortunately, the legal economy is currently 
dependent on rainfall and foreign financial aid. Shortfalls of international funding and 
long and severe droughts would hamper economic growth and lead back to the narcotics 
industry with its poppy cultivation. Besides that, it is of utmost importance to develop not 
only a strong macroeconomic roadmap, but also a microeconomic one. The international 
military presence has to promote economic efforts whenever and wherever possible. 
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The main findings in this chapter are. 
• Islam prevails in Afghanistan and Pakistan with its political dimension 
seeking political power, but it is no longer a unifying force as it was, for 
instance, during the Soviet occupation. 
• This religious-political force is still a powder keg and poses today threats 
to the Afghan population and to the international community. 
• The Taliban’s goals have not yet been fulfilled and thus, they will 
continue to fight their jihad against weak Islamic leadership in Kabul and 
the international community. 
• The Taliban have imposed structural defects on the Pashtuns due to their 
relatively long period of activity since their beginnings in 1979. 
• The Pashtuns deny external authorities from Kabul and from the 
international community except their maliks, which are currently 
marginalized. 
• Afghanistan as a state does not function as western states, for instance, in 
Europe due to tribalism in general, and the Pashtunwali in particular. 
• The maliks have to be strengthened and the jirgas have to be involved in 
the nation-building process in Afghanistan. 
• Other Islamist movements such as HQN, HIG and Al-Qaeda are 
embedded in the same way as the Taliban and thus, fighting the roots of 
the Taliban automatically means fighting the other movements. 
• Afghanistan’s economy is growing. However, besides the feasible 
macroeconomic plans, microeconomic efforts have to be added and 
strengthened. 
• A sustainable economy is major contributor to stability although it 
requires a certain level of security. 
• Financial international aid has to increase. 
One has to understand the religious-political force and the tribal environment as 
well as the respective power-holders, either the mullahs or the maliks, and the social 
behavior of the respective groups, based on religious or tribal motives, to know what the 
presence of the international community in a state like Afghanistan, which is definitely 
not functioning like a Western democracy, means. If one follows the economic analysis, 
one realizes that a mere military solution for stabilizing the region is not possible, but 
needs a huge political, social, economic and aid approach headed toward Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, tailored to the cultural environment. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This work provides insight into the U.S. and German-led PRTs in Afghanistan 
and scrutinizes their performance. In Afghanistan, history has proven that huge dynamics 
occur when foreign forces invade or occupy the country. This work focuses on the entire 
analytical framework as well as influencing factors such as the political-religious force, 
tribalism, and the economic situation, as major contributors to stability or instability, 
depending on the perspective. Thus, this work also provides advanced understanding and 
updated information on Afghanistan, the presence of the international community and 
domestic issues. The recommendations presented in this chapter are more of a general 
character rather than a specific one.  
Based on the main findings and respective conclusions of each chapter, two 
overall conclusions are drawn. First, the PRTs are a limited asset and have come to a 
standstill regarding the fulfillment of their objectives. PRTs are joint military-civil teams 
conducting stability operations and reconstruction projects and there is little doubt about 
their initial successes. However, improvements to PRTs are required for certain Afghan 
districts. The structural capabilities, along with the available resources of the respective 
PRTs, did what they were able to do. NATO defined the spectrum of intervention and it 
is obvious that the PRTs, with their structure and capabilities, are most relevant for the 
stability stage of post-conflict situations where situations are relatively calm and stable. 
Within this environment, it is the PRT’s crucial task to ensure that the situation does not 
deteriorate. The stage before, in which kinetic operations or high intensity war-fighting 
prevail, due to an insecure environment, will most likely find that the PRTs are too weak, 
militarily, to contribute. Furthermore, at the next stage, in which a sustainable 
development has to occur, PRTs are too weak on the civil side, especially in terms of 
cooperation with several NGOs, to concentrate the development and aid activities 
required. This means that the structure of PRTs has to be flexible and must be adjusted to 
the respective requirements. There is no fixed PRT module that can be deployed to all 
post-conflict scenarios. Changing the structural capabilities of PRTs may be required at 
different periods of time, within a few weeks, a few months, or several months. Secondly, 
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the deployment of more and more troops will not improve the security situation on the 
ground. When analyzing the political, religious, tribal and economic factors, it becomes 
obvious that the military is only a small brick in the wall and that there are spheres of 
problems that can never be solved militarily. It is the conclusion of this thesis that the 
fewer foreign forces there are on Afghan soil, the more pleased the Afghan population 
will be. This, in turn (because of traditional Afghan suspicion of outsiders and 
occupation) will probably improve the overall situation. There is not a single metric in 
either the political, economic, military or social sector that will guarantee success. A 
comprehensive, joint and concurrent approach of certain measures over all sectors will 
lead to synergies, and finally to a culmination point, in which the security situation 
improves significantly. A holistic approach is worth more than strategies focused on 
separate issues. 
The following policy recommendations are derived from the findings of this 
thesis. The recommendations are subdivided into two parts. The first recommendations 
deal with the PRT structure and strategy while the second group of recommendations 
involves PRT’s framework, environment and other influencing factors. 
• PRTs in Afghanistan are all part of the ISAF mission and not part of the 
OEF mission. Stick to the assisting character of ISAF to retain a minimum 
level of legitimacy provided by the Afghans. The OEF mission has a 
completely different character and can provoke resentments due to its 
combat nature, which can lead to collateral damage.  
• PRTs do not need a common concept or a joint or grand strategy. Each 
nation has its own understandings concerning its approach due to available 
resources, operational requirements and necessities. The deployment of 
military forces will necessarily reflect a country’s foreign policies. Each 
nation has its own interests as well as the overall objectives defined by the 
international community and NATO. Caveats for individual countries will 
always be operable because military forces are part of the national 
sovereignty and only reluctantly given to the control of a multinational 
commander. 
• PRTs are only a limited asset for post-conflict scenarios. Either the PRT 
has to be relieved completely or the structure and thus the capabilities 
have to be changed, depending on the spectrum of intervention in which 




by the will of the respective nation to change the structure as the situation 
and environment requires. Clearly defined responsibilities, roles and 
missions are mandatory for each individually participating country. 
• For peace enforcement operations, PRTs have to be able to request the 
support of a QRF (ideally collocated to the respective RCs). This QRF has 
to be highly mobile and able to conduct high intensity war-fighting. 
Additionally, air assets to conduct offensive air operations have to be 
available. 
• PRTs are only a small contributor to the rebuilding of Afghanistan and 
they are not suitable for solving political, religious, tribal or economic 
issues. 
Recommendations that are linked to the framework, environment and other 
influencing factors: 
• The overall political process, initiated in Bonn 2001 and continued in 
London in 2006, has to be re-stimulated. Both conferences have focused 
on domestic issues such as the government, the constitution, and the state 
of Afghanistan itself. But now it is of utmost importance to focus on 
Afghanistan’s foreign relations, especially with its adjacent countries. 
Talks and negotiations are necessary for resolving disputes and for gaining 
cooperation as well as diplomatic and economic activities. Issues such as 
the Durand Line and the question of the Pashtuns have to be addressed.  
• The SSR process has to be restructured because the multilateral sector 
approach is inefficient. Unity of command is recommended to streamline 
and concentrate the efforts. 
• The international commitment toward funding and providing available 
resources for a sustainable development must be strengthened. 
• Coordination of all aid efforts and activities is vital to the success of the 
international community’s Afghan mission. 
• The training, guidance and equipment of the ANA, ANP and ANBP have 
to be strengthened. There is no way to produce stability without reliable 
internal Afghan security forces. 
• Afghanistan does not function as a western democratic state. Democracy 
is unknown to the majority of the Afghans. Afghanistan’s behavior, 
especially in the rural areas, is rooted in tribal affairs. A high level of 
cultural understanding is necessary, as well as direct contact with the tribal 
Afghan population. Tribal elders and jirgas have to be strengthened, as 
opposed to mullahs and shuras. 
• Moderate Taliban have to be integrated into the political development of 
Afghanistan. In addition, it must be recognized that Islam is a driving 
factor in Afghanistan. 
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• The economy has to be rebuilt and economic aid must be provided to 
determine an economic and development roadmap with sustainable 
effects. The illicit economy can only be reduced gradually, because the 
livelihood of too many Afghans relies upon it. 
History has shown that nations who have invaded or attempted to occupy 
Afghanistan have eventually left in defeat. The British and the Soviets learned this lesson 
well and left Afghanistan defeated. We cannot let this history repeat itself, especially 
considering the role Afghanistan has played in so many of the terrorist acts of the last 
decade. 
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